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ABSTRACT

reorganization of the executive
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF PUERTO branch
RICOTHEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND
LEGITIMACY
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
SEPTEMBER 1996

MARIO ACOSTA VELEZ, B.A., UNIVERSITY
OF PUERTO RICO
M.P.A.,
M.A.,

UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST

Directed by: Professor Jeffrey Sedgwick
The main purpose of the study is to
provide an

understanding of the evolution of

a

legitimate executive

branch in Puerto Rico through the tool of
executive
reorganization.

This study looks at two reorganizations of

the executive branch

(the first one initiated by Governor

Pedro Rosello in 1993)

using the theoretical perspectives

that guided the evolution of the administrative state
in
the United States:

the Founders

,

view on executive

reorganization, the managerial perspective of the early
20th century,

and the legitimacy perspective, which

broadens the Founders' concept of an energetic executive
and contests the managerial perspective's focus on

presidential supremacy.
The first two theoretical perspectives

and the managerial perspectives)

(the Founders'

shaped the way the

Governor's role in administration was formulated and

v

exercised in this century and
guided the evolution of a
strong executive.
However, this evolution created
a basis
for the perceived illegitimacy
of the administrative state.
This illegitimacy resides in an
instrumental view of
public administration that confines
the public

administration to be used as

a

mere instrument of the chief

executive and focuses on how to make the
executive branch
more responsible and directly accountable
to the Governor.
This study concludes that

a

new discourse is necessary

to bring a view of public administration
as a collaborative

partner in the process of governance.

This new discourse

has to embrace the legitimacy perspective to
emphasize the

functions of administrative agencies as government

institutions in pursuit of the public interest.

It must

also recognize the formal virtue of public administrators
as actors in the process of governance,

and adopt the

concept of the public interest as the appropriate normative
basis for public administrators.
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INTRODUCTION

Executive reorganization has been a gubernatorial tool

during the 20th century to change the conception of

administrative authority in the political and

administrative systems in Puerto Rico and to elaborate on
the role of the governor in administration.

This study

argues that executive reorganization is offered, in Puerto
Rico as in the United States, as a means to efficiency and

responsibility, but is in real measure an instrument of a

strengthened chief executive with heightened authority over
administration.

In 1949,

Luis Munoz-Marin,

the first

elected Governor of Puerto Rico, used this tool to initiate
the modern governorship.

reorganization constituted

For the first time,
a

executive

successful effort to establish

an administrative state with centralization of substantial

managerial authority in the Governor as the chief
executive. This established a precedent for later

reorganizations.

The most recent one,

initiated by

Governor Pedro Rosello in 1993, provided continuity to the
enhancement of the managerial role of the Governor as chief

executive of the executive branch.
This study examines these two reorganizations using
the theoretical framework that guided the evolution of the

1

administrative state in the United States.

The Founders'

insight on executive organization, the managerial

perspective of the early 20th Century, and the theory of
legitimacy of the administrative state are the theoretical

perspectives used in this study.

I

seek to understand how

these theoretical perspectives shaped the way the

Governor's role in administration was formulated and

exercised in this century.

The fundamental questions are:

Does the reorganization movement that these theoretical

perspectives guided in the context of the United States
have any relation to executive reorganization in Puerto
Rico?

And,

do they relate to the success of the first

comprehensive reorganization of the executive branch in
1949?

The answers to these questions are essential to

acquire a basic understanding of executive reorganization
in Puerto Rico.

Furthermore, understanding these

theoretical models and their dominant principles of

organization is a matter of great importance for examining
the practice of reorganization in Puerto Rico.
this understanding,

Based on

this study attempts to show that

reorganization of the executive branch of the Government of
Puerto Rico was based on an external model of executive

organization conducive to the evolution of
2

a

strong

.

executive.

However,

this evolution created a basis for the

perceived illegitimacy of the administrative state.
Executive reorganizations in Puerto Rico constitute in

many ways an interesting political and administrative
phenomena.
a

The effect of both the Founders' conception of

strong executive and the managerial perspective's focus

on executive supremacy on the evolution of the executive in

Puerto Rico has not been studied extensively.

This makes

the practice of reorganization planning in Puerto Rico

worth studying because of its contribution to the evolution
of a strong governorship and its relationship to

administration
The paramount purpose of this study is to provide an

understanding of the evolution of a legitimate executive
branch in Puerto Rico through the tool of executive
reorganization.

Why did reorganizations of the executive
What form did the

branch occur in Puerto Rico?

administrative state take?
reorganizations follow?

What models did the

What conflicts or controversies

arose during the processes?

Ultimately, which of these

reorganizations met the need of establishing the legitimacy
of the Executive Branch of the Government of Puerto Rico?

These questions are addressed by examining the

evidentiary work left behind by these reorganizations.
3

The

.

empirical analysis relies on reports and recommendations,

government documents, press conferences and newspaper
articles.

Since many of these sources were originally

written in Spanish,

I

translated them into English for

their reference in this study.

reorganization,

In the case of the 1993

for which many of the records are still

unaccessible to researchers,

I

have only had access to

limited empirical material for analysis.

In addition,

no

comprehensive studies of this reorganization have been
made
The format of this study consists of five chapters.

chapter one,

I

In

examine three different theoretical

perspectives on the role of the chief executive in

administration that lay the framework for the empirical
analysis of the reorganizations in Puerto Rico.
two,

I

In chapter

provide a summary of three federal reorganizations

that applied the general principles of organization

expressed by the Founders and the managerial perspective.
In chapter three,

I

focus on the first comprehensive

reorganization of the executive branch in Puerto Rico
initiated by Luis Munoz-Marin through the Rowe Commission
in 1949.

This reorganization is treated as the founding of

the Puerto Rican Administrative State.

In chapter four,

discuss the most recent reorganization of the Executive
4

I

.

Branch of the Government of Puerto Rico, the New Beginning,
and compare it to the reorganization recommended by the

Rowe Commission.

Finally,

in chapter five,

I

present the

conclusions of this study and address its main research
questions

5

CHAPTER

I

THEORETICAL PRESPECTIVES ON THE ROLE OF THE
PRESIDENT AS CHIEF EXECUTIVE
This chapter examines three theoretical perspectives
on the role of the President as Chief Executive.

First,

it

examines the Founders' insight into executive organization.
Second,

it discusses the classical emphasis on

presidential supremacy put forth in the managerial
perspective.

Finally,

it readdresses these two views on

executive organization using the perspective on legitimacy
of the Administrative State,
In this chapter,

I

the legitimacy perspective.

propose three main notions.

One is

that the Founders' normative view on executive organization
is expressed both in the creation of an energetic executive

with limited legislative interference in the business of

administration and in their concern for the values of unity
and responsibility as principles of executive organization.
The second one is that the managerial perspective, evident

during the period known as the Classical Approach to Public

Administration (the period of formation of self-conscious
American public administration theory)

,

justified a

president ially-controlled executive establishment that led
6

.

to an instrumental view of Public Administration.

The

third notion is that the legitimacy perspective broadens
the Founders'

concept of an energetic executive and

contests the managerial perspective's focus on presidential

supremacy

The founders on executive organization

The founders brought with them to the Federal

Convention in 1787 their experience with

a

weak executive.

This experience conditioned their orientation toward a

strong executive centered on the values of executive unity,
energy,

and responsibility.

To understand the founders'

view on the executive, a brief look at the state and
national experiences prior to the Constitution is in order.

Under most state constitutions, the executive was
inherently subordinate to the legislature (Thach, 1922).
This subordination was reflected in features such as short
terms,

strict limitations on re-eligibility, and election

by the legislature.

According to Thach, legislative

dominance also conditioned the executive's liberty of
action.

The executive's use of power,

had to

for example,

be in accord with the advice of an executive council

chosen,

save in Pennsylvania, by the Legislature.
7

As Thach

.

states,

subordination was further evidenced by "the common

practice of expressly submitting the exercise of either
certain enumerated powers, the field of enumerated powers,
or even the whole of the executive power to the legislative

will

(p

"

.

2 9

)

.

Through the state constitutions, the legislatures were

empowered to determine all matters concerning the
executive. They, by virtue of constitutional language that

placed priority in the power of making laws, were
considered the sovereign authority.
has observed,

As James Ceaser

(1979)

"the pressure for a more direct expression of

the will of the people led to the rise of the popular

branch of the legislature as the supreme and unchecked
sovereign..."
words,

(p.48). The state legislatures,

in Thach's

kept the executive departments "under close

supervision and control, interfered with them in their
constitutional spheres, dictated to them what they should
do by laws which they were unable to oppose"

instance, Corwin (1984) notes,

(p.34)

For

the Virginia constitution

stipulated that the exercise of the executive power was to
be in accordance with the law and that the executive could

not claim any prerogative by virtue of any law,

custom of England.

statute, or

The net effects were legislative

supremacy based "on the claim to immediate representation
8

.

.

.

of the popular will"

(Ceaser

p.49

,

and the organization of

the executive "in such a fashion as to ensure a complete

subordination.
followed"

And such

,

in general,

As a result,

(p.27)

was the process

executive power was

diminished and the execution of the laws depended on the
legislature
Under the Articles of Confederation,

lack of

a

national formal executive power pointed to legislative
supremacy.

As Theodore J. Lowi

(1985)

has observed,

"several executive departments were created,

including

Foreign Affairs, War, Marine, and Treasury, but the heads
of these departments were obliged to report to Congress"
(p.31)

These departments, Richard Pious stated,

.

"were

appendages of the legislature, not an executive branch"
(quoted in Lowi, p.31)

This condition shows that Congress

played the roles of both legislature and executive.
consequence was

a

The

congressional inability to supply

continuous direction and coordination of administrative
agencies.
(1966)

In order to solve this problem,

Kallenback

points out, Congress considered the partial

transformation of itself from an active administrator to
the enactor of administrative laws.

Its role centered on

setting up permanent agencies, fixing their duties by

permanent rules, providing means for
9

controlling them in their activities, and determining their
relations to their creator.
Congress' acknowledgment of its inability to conduct
the business of administration initiated a trend toward a

real executive.

The Federalists

As Leonard D. White
,

(1948)

argues in

this transformation embodied a

congressional acceptance of the superior position of the
executive in relation to departments. However, it did not
represent Congress' willingness to rid itself of

administrative details (Thach, 1922).
Congress ensured its influence over administration by

creating committees to carry out orders from itself.
naval committee,

The

for example, had the responsibility as

administrator of reporting measures for congressional
consideration.

It also created the standing committee of

five to supervise the Treasury.

These bodies had not only

to report on individual matters,

but also on policies and

even administrative laws.

In this way,

Congress continued

to settle matters of minute detail on the floor, while

leaving to the administrative agency the ministerial duty
of carrying out each decision as it was reached.

Even this ministerial system raised doubts among the

founders as to its ability to provide a good

administration.

Hamilton,

for instance,
10

claimed that

Congress was unable to act with sufficient decision or

system because of keeping too much power in its own hands
and interfering as to every detail of administration.

The

system of boards, in his view, had the disadvantage of
being slower, having less energy, and diffusing
responsibility. He favored limiting Congress' function to

passing legislation,

for it proved its inability to conduct

the business of administration.

This position evidenced

Hamilton's tendency toward the value of executive

responsibility for administration as
government.

a

quality of

As he said in Federalist 71,

to be subordinate to the laws,

on the legislative body.

good

a

"It is one thing

and another to be dependent

The first comports with,

the last

violates, the fundamental principles of good government"
(

Federalist Papers

,

p.433).

We can infer that the state and national experiences

prior to the Constitution pointed to the functional
separation of powers as
of executive power.

a

solution to the problem of lack

These experiences led the founders to

accept the assumption that the separation between Congress
and the Executive would not only provide a protection

against abusive power, but also produce governmental
efficiency.

This set the basis for the founders' concern

11

on executive organization.

Let us see how this concern was

expressed in the Philadelphia Convention.
In 1787,

the Founders took a more favorable view of

executive power (Ceaser, 1979)

.

As Corwin

(1984)

suggested, a main concern for the delegates in the Federal

Convention was how to solve the problem of weak executive
power with regard to administration.
challenge,

To address this

the Framers of the Constitution agreed upon

establishing a national chief executive with the power of
overall superintendence of government operations
(Kallenback,

1966)

Founders' view,

.

The term chief executive,

in the

referred to the President's role of

guaranteeing the faithful execution of the laws and

maintaining an effective executive authority over the
administrative bureaucracy.

As to establishing the role of

faithful execution of the laws, the Founders were reacting
to the problem of distribution of power as well as to the

bases of political authority prevalent in the state

governments.

The Founders,

states Ceaser,

"saw the popular

assembly as a symptom of a reliance on popular authority"
(p

.

49

)

.

This base of political authority was for the founders
an informal influence that represented a threat to

constitutional government.

They looked to the President as
12

.

the embodiment of energy and statesmanship.

Ceaser,

statesmanship,

According to

in the Founders' view,

referred to

the ability to use personal judgement to distance oneself

from the immediate pressures of public opinion.

President was, Ceaser says,

The

"to reach beyond the partial

and selfish interest of any group within society and

consult the public interest as a whole"

(p.50).

Thus,

the

Chief Executive was to be a strong executive capable of

restraining any excessive tendencies toward popular

authority
The Founders' emphasis on non-partisan election

supports this conception of

a

Chief Executive.

The role of

the Chief Executive was to be non-popular, which meant

based on the formal character of its office.

His power was

to rest on the legally defined prerogatives of the office

"in which the claim to rule was based on the constituted

authority of the institutions'

(Ceaser,

p.49).

This

implies that the purpose of election was only to select the
president, not to arm him with authority beyond that

provided by the Constitution.

One can say that the

Founders, by assigning the President the role of

guaranteeing the faithful execution of the laws, intended
to prevent the President

(Ceaser,

p.51)

"from becoming a popular favorite"

They did not favor a president who was a
13

popular leader possessing a mandate,
favoring popular demands.

for this would lead to

Therefore,

the purpose was to

secure that presidential authority "was not overwhelmed by
-*-^formal

sxtraconstitut ional authority, by power based

on 'charisma' or assertions of representations of the

immediate popular will"

(Ceaser,

p.51).

The role of maintaining an effective executive

authority over the administrative bureaucracy presupposes
the framers' purpose of placing an energetic president at
the top of the executive structure.
(1960)

Clinton Rossiter

contends that the framers charged the President with

the duty of running the government to produce "good

administration."

According to Rossiter, the framers

considered the President to be the person able to fulfill
this duty.

This reflects the framers' aim at making the

President accountable for the conduct of administrative
affairs.

The President, observes Rossiter, was to be

accountable for the efficiency of the national
administration. Thus,

the framers'

goal was to secure a

strong executive capable of guiding the executive

establishment they created and promoting responsibility and

efficiency to assure good government.
At the Constitutional Convention,

The Founders

addressed several issues regarding the national executive.
14

Constitutional considerations included issues such as
execut i ve - legi s la t i ve separation,
executive,
salary,

the number of the

election of the executive, the executive's

and the executive's administrative authority.

Relevant to the argument advanced in this study are the
issues of separation, number, and administrative authority.
The plans presented at the National Convention

constituted embodiments of the framers

1

views on executive

organization and the role of the President as Chief
Executive. The Virginia plan, the first presented at the

Convention by Edmund Randolph (but mostly written by James
Madison)

,

advocated for executive independence as a

necessary ingredient for the organization of the executive.
The number of the executive was undetermined, probably

because Randolph, the formal presenter of the plan, opposed
a

unitary executive while Madison apparently favored it.

As Thach reasons,

the executive,

had this proposal been

approved, would have been a small .committee of states with
the responsibility of carrying out the laws.
to the proposal,

Wilson (from Pennsylvania), who "was the

strongest supporter of the strong executive"
p.ll),

As a reaction

(Corwin,

stated that there should be a single magistrate

characterized by energy, dispatch and responsibility
(Debates, June

1,

p.46).

He considered that the powers of
15

the executive were strictly those of executing
the law and

appointing officers with the exception of those who
were to
be appointed by the legislature under constitutional

provision.

He moved then to amend the Randolph plan

promptly upon completion of Randolph's presentation.
Wilson's rejection of the plural executive thus relied on
his belief that it would undermine the principles of

executive accountability and responsibility.
The Paterson plan constituted a second view on

executive organization.
executive,

Even though it retained the plural

this plan reaffirmed the Virginia Plan's

emphasis on the executive as an organ completely separate
from the legislature.
authority,

In terms of administrative

the executive was to execute the federal acts,

appoint all federal officers not otherwise provided by the
Constitution, and direct all military operations.
essence,
Hence,

In

it embodied the principle of separation of powers.
it

favored an independent administrative executive

with control of military operations and appointments.

The

Virginia and Paterson plans therefore intended to preclude
the exercise of both executive and legislative powers by
the same branch.

Hamilton's conception of the executive was stronger
than either those of Wilson or Paterson.
16

His executive was

.

to have the sole appointment of the heads or
chief officers
of the departments of Finance, War,

Hamilton

s

and Foreign Affairs.

desire for a strong executive stemmed from his

conviction that the country suffered under the Articles of

Confederation from the lack of adequate executive power
(Corwin,

1985)

.

For this reason, he favored a centralized

government without the weak executive that characterized

many of the states of the time (Caldwell, 1988)
Federalist he wrote,

In The

.

"The true test of a good government is

its attempt and tendency to produce a good administration"

(quoted in Rossiter, p.19).
In The Administrative Theories of Hamilton and

Jefferson

,

Lynton

K.

Caldwell condensed Hamilton's views on

executive organization into

a

few principles.

These

principles centered on the notion of strong executive
centralization.

Caldwell identified energy as

a

core

principle in Hamilton's view of good government.
Federalist 70, Hamilton asserted,

In

"Energy in the executive

is a leading character in the definition of a good

government"

(

Federalist Papers

,

p.423)

In the same

Federalist 70, he revealed his position in favor of an
energetic executive by stating:

"A feeble executive

implies a feeble execution of the government.

17

A feeble

)

execution is but another phrase for a bad

execution ..."

(p

.

423

.

Hamilton argued that four ingredients constituted the
source of executive energy.

conducive to energy.

Unity he believed to be

He concluded that unity in the

executive was indispensable for energetic administration.
A plural executive was a pernicious alternative for

Hamilton.
activity,

As he said in Federalist 70,

secrecy,

"Decision,

and dispatch will generally characterize

the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree

than the proceedings of any great number; and in proportion
as the number is increased,

diminished"

(

these qualities will be

Federalist Papers

,

p.424). In this way, he

connected with Wilson's argument that a strong executive
should be a single magistrate characterized by energy.
Hamilton also considered duration as

requisite for energy in the Executive.

a

necessary

He contended that

duration would provide the executive with personal firmness
in the employment of his constitutional powers and ensure

stability of the system of administration (Federalist 71).
A brief tenure would condemn a magistrate to feebleness and

irresolution in his administration.
said,

Duration, Hamilton

"is necessary to give the officer himself the

inclinations and the resolution to act his part well, and
18

)

.

to the community time and leisure to observe
the tendency

of his measures,

and thence to form an experimental

estimate of their merits"
Papers

,

p 436
.

(Federalist 72,

Federalist

.

Besides unity and duration, Hamilton considered

competent power as an important ingredient of energy.

According to Caldwell, Hamilton considered that "only a
powerful executive could be responsible for the promotion
of great interests"

power,

(p.28)

The importance of competent

in Hamilton's view characterized as a qualified

negative upon the acts and resolutions of the two houses of
the legislature,

resided in that "it furnishes an

additional security against the enaction of improper laws.
Caldwell includes the principle of adequate provision for
support as closely related to competent powers

.

Support of

executive authority was for Hamilton essential to safeguard
the independence of the executive.

As Hamilton contends,

without proper attention to the principle of adequate
support "the separation of the executive from the

legislative department would be merely nominal and
nugatory"

(Federalist 73, Federalist Papers

,

p.441).

The last principle Caldwell identified as part of

Hamilton's view on executive organization was

19

.

Responsibility.

This principle was for Hamilton an

essential ingredient for good administration.

"While

Hamilton desired a strong executive, he also desired one

which was responsible,
responsibility was

a

wrote White (1948)

"

.

Executive

requisite intended to encourage an

energetic performance of duties and restrain usurping
practices.

Hamilton understood responsibility as "due

dependence on the people", including accountability of
administrators to the people through their representatives.
In a republican sense,

"due dependence on the people" and

"due responsibility" were identified as the ingredients

which constitute safety.

This emphasis on dependence as

"the safest guarantee of responsible conduct"

p.30)

(Caldwell,

reflected Hamilton's beleif that this "republican

principle demands that the deliberate sense of the
community should govern the conduct of those to whom they
intrust the management of their affairs; but it does not

require an unqualified complaisance to every sudden breeze
of passion,

or to every transient impulse which the people

may receive from the arts of men"
Federalist Papers

.

p.

(Federalist 71,

432)

The Pinckney plan,

the final proposal to organize the

executive power, delineated the power of the president.

In

conceptualizing the President as the executive authority of
20

the United States,
in the President,

this proposal vested the executive power
not in the Executive Branch.

The

Executive was entitled to take care that the laws of the

United States be executed.

He was also granted the

authority to appoint executive officers in order to assure
good administration.
The Pinckney plan portrayed the President as Chief

Executive with power to assure efficiency and
responsibility in the executive branch.

As Thach noted,

"the President can use his power to check upon the

officers, keep them attentive to their duty, and may be the

means in time not only of preventing and correcting errors,
but also of detecting and punishing mal practice"

(p.

109

).

It can be inferred that the Pinckney plan foresaw the duty

of reorganization as executive and necessary whenever the

existing organization precludes executive efficiency.
The opposition to the proposed plans provided an

argument against unity, energy and independence as

principles of executive organization.

Sherman,

even though

he was not in opposition to a single executive, considered

the executive magistracy nothing more than an institution
for carrying the will of the Legislature into effect.

This

was a conception of a weak executive that was supported by

other delegates.

Randolph was against unity in the
21

.

executive

,

monarchy.

.

.

so he characterized it as the "foetus of

This reflected his fear of a too-powerful

executive.

Gorham rejected independence of the executive

and his re-eligibility (Debates

,

p.46)

It is clear that a

fear of monarchy led the leaders of the opposition to

strongly reject the propositions favoring a strong
executive.

Nevertheless, their arguments proved

ineffective in precluding the establishment of the proposed
executive
It is important to note that the New York Constitution

influenced these constitutional plans.

In reference to our

focus on executive authority over administration,

constitution stipulated:

this

"It shall be the duty of the

governor to inform the legislature at every session of the

condition of the state so far as may concern his
department; to recommend such matters to their

consideration as shall appear to him to concern its good
government; to transact all necessary business with the

officers of government; to take care that the laws are

faithfully executed to the best of his ability ...( Thach,
p.lll)

.

Therefore,

this document represented an act to

institute the executive's authority to recommend and effect
changes in the administration in order to produce good

government
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Article II of the finished Constitution reflects the
influence of the Pinckney plan in its creation.
sentence of this article states:

The first

"The Executive power

shall be vested in a President of the United Sates of

America

.

In section B,

it says that the President

"shall

take care to the best of his ability that the laws be

faithfully executed."

This language, which implicitly

reflects an emphasis on executive oversight, justifies the
role of the President as Chief Executive of the executive

branch

Although the delegates engaged in a debate regarding
how to organize the executive branch they were
establishing, the Constitution they approved is largely
silent regarding how the Executive Branch should be formed.

Provisions from the Morris-Pinckney Plan, submitted on
August 20th, about organization of the executive

departments were not included in the finished constitution
because department organization was considered

legislative determination.

Thus,

a

the Constitution's

ambiguous language on organizational matters tends to belie
the framers'

concern for principles of executive

organization (Moe
However,

&

Gilmore,

1995)

.

the fact that the Constitution is silent

regarding executive structure does not mean that it was not
23

a

concern for its creators.

The constitutional clause that

empowers the President to require written opinions from his

subordinates evidences the founders
President as Chief Executive.

1

conception of the

A more important point is

that the framers elevated the President's position of

executive authority and initiative based on the formal
character of the office.

Above all, they acknowledged the

capability of the President to ensure good administration
by virtue of his independence, unity,

responsibility.

energy,

and

Good Government, in their view, was not

only efficient government but also one responsive to the

Constitution.

In this sense,

it was the president's role

to use his independence to restrain informal influences

that could represent a threat to constitutional government.

The Managerial Perspective

The managerial perspective, which is identified with
the traditional American public administration theory of
the early 20th century (known as the Classical Approach to

Public Administration),

reaffirmed the founders' concern

for a strong executive with formal administrative

authority.

As Dwight Waldo

(1985)

24

asserted in The

e

Administrative

S t at

,

one of the major themes addressed

within the classical approach was centralization of
executive authority.
Here

I

use the term executive authority to refer to

centralization of substantial authority in the President as

manager of the executive branch.
the framers

conception of the role of the President as

Chief Executive.
sense,

This is different from

While Chief Executive, in the framers'

refers to the highest officer of the executive

branch with responsibility for its guidance and the
faithful execution of the laws, Chief Executive,

in the

managerial sense, refers to a President who controls and
manages the executive branch.

Although executive authority

under the managerial perspective embodies the Founders'

view of centralization, unification, and integration of
executive activities under the President, it includes

a

notion of policy initiative in the Executive Branch,
legitimated by the President's electoral mandate.
The managerial perspective is a reflection of the

classical emphasis on executive centralization.

It aims at

centralizing responsibility, strengthening the

administrative role of the President through

a

strong

hierarchical control within the executive branch, and
integrating executive agencies in the name of efficiency.
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)

Represented by what Bryan Fry (1989) identifies as
the
Departamentalists the managerial perspective puts emphasis
,

on executive authority by drawing attention towards

administrative management and structure.

It reflects a

desire for enhancement of executive authority, which echoes
the intention of the framers of establishing a strong

executive.

authority

Like the founders'

insight on executive

it is a normative view on executive

,

organization
The managerial perspective,

"underlying the

development of 20th century reorganization planning"
(Arnold,

1986,

President.

p.4),

emphasizes a managerial role for the

It views comprehensive reorganization planning

as a function of the Chief Executive.

It places the

executive branch under the authority of the Chief Executive
and defines good administration in terms of presidential

capacity to manage the executive branch.
the contention that,

it carries

Thus,

in order to be efficient,

government

must maintain a strong executive managerial capacity
(Arnold,

p 47
.

.

In this section,

I

focus on the work of Luther Gulick

as representative of the managerial perspective.

His work

on government structure is central to the argument advanced
in this study.

I

use Gulick

's
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work because of its

attention to structural reform and his prescription on
consolidation,

integration, and rationalization of

executive activities as means to assure an efficient and
effective administration.
What identifies Gulick with the managerial perspective
is his strong emphasis on the enhancement of executive

power within the executive branch.

His theory of

administrative reform prescribes unity and leadership as
requisites for effective administration and advocates for

a

strong executive as necessary for the proper coordination
of government agencies.

Unification of executive activities implies the
development of mechanisms of coordination in the
organization.

Gulick elaborates on the structure of

authority and shared ideas as two mechanisms of
coordination.

Control and leadership are vital elements of

the structure of executive authority.

Coordination through

control requires a single overall directing executive
authority,

the provision of supervision for each job, and

the determination of the unit tasks into which the overall

job will have to be divided.

Coordination through

leadership requires unity of the executive.

Under the structure of authority, the Executive is

assigned specific functions summed up in the acronym
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POSDCORB

.

The letters of the acronym stand for the

.

functions of Planning, Organizing, Staffing, Directing,
Coordinating, Reporting, and Budgeting.

This wide range of

functions supports the role of the President as the manager
of the executive branch.

As Gulick

(1937)

writes,

"In view

of the fact that the job of the president as Chief

Executive is POSDCORB,

institutionalization must not be

allowed to take any one of these functions out of his
office"

(p

.

14

)

.

This is a theory that limits Congress to

approving the president ially-controlled organization.
Therefore, we can deduce that he considers reorganization

planning to be an executive function that should not be

performed by any other branch of government
Coordination by ideas, the second mechanism of
coordination, presupposes that reliance on coordination in

organization, though necessary,

produce effective operation.

is not sufficient to

A dominant central idea is

the foundation of organization, action and selfAs Gulick asserts,

coordination.

this mechanism is

necessary for developing the desire and will to work
together with

a

common purpose (p.37)

Gulick elaborated several principles of organization
that reflect the essence of the managerial perspective.

These principles centered on the creation of
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a

strong

.

executive

end.

.

the consolidation of agencies.

More relevant

to this study are the following:
1)

All agencies should be consolidated into a few

departments
2)

The power of the department head should be

commensurate with his responsibility.
3)

Responsibility for each function should be vested
in a specific official.

4)

All administrative work should be headed up under a

single chief executive, who should be directly

elected by, and responsible to, the voters or their

representatives
5)

The chief executive should have the power to

appoint and discharge department heads and to
direct their work.
6)

The chief executive should have a research staff to

report on the work of the departments and search
for improved methods of operations.

These principles were applied particularly in the

President's Committee on Administrative Management in 1937,
as we will see in the next chapter.

The managerial perspective carries a vision of an

integrated executive.

According to Gulick, integration is

required to provide central coordination of "unit tasks"
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.

defined by the division of work in the organization.
"Notes on the Theory of Organization,

"

In

he identifies four

bases into which the unit tasks of an organization can be
grouped:

1)

purpose, which groups tasks by the service

provided;

2)

process, under which tasks are grouped by the

skill or technology employed;
4)

3)

clientele or material; and

place (p.21-25)
The managerial perspective,

of Luther Gulick,

examined through the work

shows a normative emphasis on integration

and executive leadership.

Unlike the framers' view on

executive authority, it portrays

a

President as manager of

the executive branch and advocates for an absolute

subordination of the executive branch to the President.
Moreover,

it seems to provide no methods by which to

preclude an integrated executive branch headed by

a

powerful chief executive from resulting in tyrannical
government
Because of its departure from the Founders' conception
of a Chief Executive,

perspective presents
leader.

one can argue that the managerial
a

view of the President as a popular

A Chief Executive comes to office with a popular

mandate acquired as a result of election.

This popular

mandate can be translated into the presidential functions
of meeting people's expectations and being responsive to
30

public opinion.

In the managerial sense,

these functions

are expressed through the emphasis on management
and

control of the executive branch which, under the assumption
that they would produce effective administration, are

devices to respond to popular pressure. This constitutes a

departure from the Founders' conception of a Chief
Executive as responsible for the faithful execution of the
laws,

a

power based on the formal character of the office

and not on popular leadership.

The Legitimacy of the Administrative State

John Rohr (1985) offers a perspective on legitimating
the Administrative State.

the framers'

This perspective elaborates on

intention to create an energetic executive and

the managerial perspective's emphasis on presidential

supremacy.

It reaffirms the former by broadening its

implications and contests the latter's focus on

presidential control.

Given that in the 20th century, with

the development of the managerial perspective,

the

President acquired a new role that both departs from the
Founders' conception of a Chief Executive and adheres to
the function of responsiveness to public opinion through
31

the exercise of inanageinent and control,

the legitimacy

perspective offers an avenue to return to the emphasis on
adherence to constitutional principles as
good government
themes:

1)

.

I

a

way to ensure

examine this perspective from two

the notion of energy in the executive, and

2)

the formal virtue of public officials.

Before discussing these two themes,

let us present a

definition of the Administrative State as viewed by the
legitimacy perspective.

The Administrative State is the

Public Administration professionalized with substantial

discretion in areas of decision making but subject to rule
of law with the president as recognized Chief Executive.

This definition includes two points that are important to

understand the emphasis on legitimacy.

One point is

"substantial discretion in areas of decision making."

This

means that public officials have the constitutional right
to address problems of administrative governance and

influence the process of policy decision-making (Rohr,
1985)

.

The second point is "subject to rule of law with

the President as recognized Chief Executive."

This implies

that the Public Administration is subordinate to

constitutional branches and is part of a hierarchical
structure with the President at the top.
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Legitimating the administrative state is not an attempt
to reject the subordinate nature of the public
bureaucracy

to the Chief Executive or Congress.

It is an act to

recognize that, by virtue of constitutional design, the
Public Administration possesses an opportunity to serve a

powerful political purpose that goes beyond simply
implementing the expression of the public opinion by either

constitutional superior.

The Public Administration has,

the legitimacy perspective's sense,

a

in

right to participate

in governance by adhering to constitutional principles.

This means that public administrators

(bureaucrats) do not

necessarily have to do what the President or Congress tell
them to do if it is at odds with the Constitution.

Thus,

the legitimacy perspective allows for the use of discretion

by bureaucrats to favor those policies that are responsive
to constitutional principles rather than to popular

pressure
The legitimacy perspective reaffirms the founders'

vision of an energetic administration.

It broadens the

interpretation of the Hamiltonian concept of energy in the
Executive.

According to Rohr, the concept of "energetic

administration" refers not only to a strong executive

vested with energy and independence, but also to an
administration entitled with formal right to assure good
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government
Rohr,

It was

"through sound administration", says

'that the loyalties of the people would gradually
be

transferred from the states to the federal government"
(p.138).

Thus,

an energetic executive implies political

value both in the president and the administration.

As

Rohr would reason, both the President and his

administration are assigned

a

political task of higher

order centered on ensuring efficient government.
The managerial perspective discussed in the previous

section overlooks this dual emphasis on energy by drawing

exclusive attention to justifying the President as

controller of the bureaucracy.

Through its single focus on

presidential supremacy over administration, it takes a
purely instrumental view of Public Administration.

This

instrumental view confines the Public Administration to a

passive role of implementation of policies designed by
elected officials. Hence, the managerial perspective

prevents the public administrators from realizing what Rohr
calls the "oath to uphold the Constitution"

uphold the Constitution means,

(p.50).

in Rohr's words,

To

"to become

the kind of persons who cherish constitutional norms and

principles"

(p.50).

The instrumental view of Public Administration

resembles the separation of politics and administration
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advocated by Frank Goodnow during the early 20th
century.
This dichotomy relies on the division of two
government
operations:
and

2)

1)

the expression of the will of the state,

the execution of the will of the state.

The

rationale of this view is that the "people elect their
representatives, who, acting in their sovereign capacity,
pass laws which are duly carried out by the Public

Administration"

(

Rohr, p.85).

This separation presupposes

the subordinate status of the administrative authorities to
the legislature based on the superiority of expression over

execution.
view,

Nevertheless,

in perpetuating the instrumental

the managerial perspective maintains a narrow

interpretation of representation that excludes public

administrators as constitutional actors from the process of

governance
The legitimacy perspective also recognizes the formal

virtue of public officials that enables them to contribute
to ensure good government

.

The founders

'

concern for the

principle of efficient government justifies legitimating
the administrative state on the basis of the formal virtue
of public officials.

That is,

it

recognizes that public

officials have the constitutional right to act as
safeguards against arbitrary power.
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To recognize the formal virtue of public
officials is

"pregnant with a legitimating argument for the
non-elected

official to participate in rule"

(Rohr,

p.79)

The basic

point is that appointive officials, like members
of
Congress, derive their authority from the Constitution.
The fact that members of Congress and the President
are

popularly elected does not make them the only
representatives of the people.
inferior to the President,

Public officials, although

"depend on the same authority

source that has created the office of the President"
Therefore,

P-80).

elected officials.

(Rohr,

representation is not endemic only to
As Rohr states,

the founders' emphasis

on the character of representation relies on the act of

pondering "the public spiritedness of bureaucrats, instead
of simply fulminating about how to curtail and control

them"

(p

.
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The formal virtue of public officials also presupposes

their liberty to choose among constitutional masters.

Public Administrators, according to Rohr, have the duty to

carry out the will of the people through the elected
officials.

His argument reflects the centrality of the

separation of powers in the United States Constitution.
Unlike the managerial perspective, he sees career officials
as responsible to both Congress and the President.
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The

basic point is that both the President and Congress have

legitimate claims as superiors of the bureaucracy
the President alone.

—

not

Having two "bosses", however, leaves

the bureaucracy (the Public Administration)

free to choose

in instances of disagreement between the President and

Congress.

This allows the bureaucrat to choose one

constitutional superior on grounds other than the fact that
he is elected.

"If these grounds",

writes Rohr,

"are

related to the constitutional principle of his oath of
office, he could justify preferring one elected official to

another on a democratic principle that is deeper than mere
election"

(p.84)

.

Thus,

the legitimacy perspective favors

substantial discretion of public administrators to obey
those policies they believe are responsive to the public
interest and assure good government.
This chapter examined three perspectives on executive

organization.

The founders' perspective,

reflecting an

effort to cure the defects of the Articles of

Confederation, centered on the establishment of

a

strong

executive with formal authority over administration.

The

managerial perspective, reflecting a theory of effective
organization, both reaffirmed this purpose by focusing on
an enhanced presidential authority and departed from the

Founders' conception of a Chief Executive. The legitimacy
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perspective,

seeking to justify the American governmental

bureaucracy

came to broaden the founders

,

'

concern for an

energetic executive and contest the managerial

perspective

s

instrumental view of Public Administration.

The next chapter turns to the practical application of the

founders

1

and the managerial perspectives in the

reorganization movement in the United States.
legitimacy perspective will be used in chapters

The
3

and

4

to

examine how the reorganization of the Executive Branch of
the Government of Puerto Rico adopted the managerial

perspective's instrumental view of Public Administration.
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CHAPTER

II

MODERN EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES

Modern Executive reorganizations under the
administrations of Presidents Roosevelt, Truman and Nixon
embraced the task of enhancing the role of the President as
Chief Executive.

They constituted serious efforts to

reorganize the executive branch centered on the nature of
executive authority, on the centralization of the executive
establishment,

and on the appropriate techniques for

ensuring sound administration and executive control.
These reorganizations were attempts to resolve the

problem of an ill-equipped presidency unable to ensure sound
management of the executive branch.

They pointed to the gap

between formal presidential authority to conduct the
business of administration and the practice.

Among the

reorganizations here examined, there seemed to be

a

intention to concretize the founders' vision of

strong

executive.

Similarly,

a

a

shared

practical application of the

managerial perspective's emphasis on presidential supremacy
over the executive branch, discussed in the previous
chapter,

is identifiable.
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branch.

From F.D. Roosevelt's perspective, the emphasis

was grounded in combining the founders
^^

'

concern for a

rong executive with the managerial perspective's

prescription of presidential control; this became, for New
Deal reformers,

the way to strengthen the Executive.

this precedent,

the grounds of reorganization under the

With

Truman Administration adopted a reaffirming style to
address the question of enhancement of executive authority.

During the Nixon Administration, the objective of

executive reorganization was to improve the President's
capacity to manage and control the executive branch.
summary,

In

these reorganizations proposed that a sound

administration should be a representation of presidential
supremacy

The President's Committee on Administrative Management
(1936-1937):

Presidential Administrative Management

Though there were earlier reorganization efforts,
President F.D. Roosevelt made the first comprehensive

attempt to reorganize the executive branch.

There were two

conditions that led Roosevelt to consider reorganization.
One condition was the growth of the US Government. The

state of an economy in disarray led to the creation of
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emergency agencies to deal with this problem.

As a result,

over a hundred agencies formally reported directly
to the

president.

The acute problem, notes Emmerich (1971), was

how to manage the sprawling and brawling executive

establishment and how to relate new and emergencies
agencies to the regular departments"

This

(p.48).

situation raised doubts abroad as to the ability of the

United States system to provide effective leadership and
solve the problem of modern government

(Arnold,

1986)

The other condition was an ill-equipped presidency

unable to effectively perform the administrative task of

coordinating the increased number of agencies

.

The

President lacked both staff assistance and the resources to
exert managerial direction of the executive branch.

Roosevelt attempted to address these problems by

bringing together agencies with overlapping policies.
achieve this goal, he considered two mechanisms.

To

First,

he

created the Executive Council on July 11, 1933 through
Executive Order 6202A.

The Council was composed of the

whole cabinet, the heads of the emergency agencies, and the
budget director.

This mechanism, however,

failed to be an

efficient instrument of policy coordination (Arnold, 1986).
President Roosevelt's second mechanism was the

National Executive Council

(NEC)
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,

created through Executive

.

Order 6433A issued on November

17,

1933.

Unlike the

Executive Council, the NEC was a smaller, more
homogeneous
and more centralized body. It included only the heads
of
the Agriculture, Commerce and Labor Departments
rather than
the whole cabinet,

and the heads of the New Deal agencies.

Nevertheless, this coordination effort failed to solve

problems that arose between agencies
On March 22,

1936,

Roosevelt established the

President's Committee on Administrative Management (The

Brownlow Committee)

This was a presidential commission to

.

study the structure of the executive branch and to make

recommendations as to how to manage it more effectively.
As Emmerich observed,

it was

"to consider the problem of

overall management of the entire executive establishment,

including the relations of the new and emergency agencies
to the regular departments"

(p.49).

The President's Committee was composed of Louis

Brownlow,

chairman,

Charles Merriam, and Luther Gulick.

These three men were selected for their knowledge,
background, and experience in executive reorganization at
the state and local levels.

Louis Bronwlow's credentials

included his work as Director of the Public Administration

Clearing House and Chairman of the Committee on Public

Administration of the Social Science Research Council at
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the University of Chicago, wide experience in
journalism

and municipal government, and service as city manager
in
Petersburg, Virgina,

and Knoxville, Tennesse (Karl,

114)

Charles Merriam had worked as an adviser to mayors,

governors and presidents, and also made contributions to

both the theory and practice of government.

Luther Gulick,

who was identified with Administrative reform movements at
the state and municipal levels, worked as Director of

Research for the Commission on Inquiry on Public Service
Personnel from 1933 to 1935, and President of the Institute
of Public Administration in New York.

The President's Committee applied to its work the

notion of presidential supremacy expressed in the
managerial perspective.

Centered on the issue of

administrative management, the Committe considered the
President as responsible for all of the national

administration.

Its underlying assumption,

says Arnold,

was "that managerial direction and control of all

departments and agencies should be centered in the
President"

(p.104)

.

The establishment of a responsible and

effective chief executive as the center of energy and
direction,

in the Committee's view, was the requisite for

an efficient administration.

Hence,
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the members of the

.

committee paid almost exclusive attention to what they

referred to as "making democracy work"
This phrase presupposed an emphasis on equipping the

President with the tools for effective direction and

supervision of the executive establishment.

As the

Committee Report stated, the President should be equipped
with "better means of managerial direction, better
personnel, better fiscal control, and better machinery for

planning in order to carry out the national aim and
programs

...

imposed upon our Executive by our Constitution"

(Report of the President's Committee on Administrative

Management,

1937,

p.51-52).

The Committee presented five main proposals oriented

toward executive strengthening and centralizing, general

prescriptions of the mangerial perspective.

One proposal

was to expand the White House staff to increase support to
the President.
a

The idea was to provide the president with

group of assistants with knowledge in administrative

affairs.

Another proposal was to strengthen and develop

the managerial agencies of the government,

including those

dealing with budget, personnel, and planning.

These

agencies were to be the management arms of the President.
The Committee also proposed to extend the merit system
upward,

outward, and downward to cover all non-policy
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determining posts, and to reorganize the Civil Service

Commission under a single administrator.

This

recommendation followed the managerial perspective's
that administrative work should be headed up

under a single chief executive.

Without granting personnel

administration functions, this proposal would strengthen
the Civil Service Commission by turning it into a Citizen

Civil Service Board to serve as watchdog of the merit

system
In addition,

the committee proposed to place the 100

independent agencies, administration, authorities, boards,
and commissions under 12 major departments.

The major

proposed departments included State, Treasury, War,
Justice,

Post Office, Navy, Conservation, Agriculture,

Commerce,

Labor,

proposal,

reflecting Gulick's principle that all agencies

Social Welfare, and Public Works.

This

should be consolidated into a few departments, put upon the
President continuing responsibility for the maintenance of

effective organization.

A final proposal was to establish

accountability of the Executive to Congress.

The mechanism

to accomplish this was an independent Auditor General

responsible for post-audit of all fiscal transactions.
Clearly,

these recommendations followed the managerial

perspective's emphasis on the values of efficiency and
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.

centralization of executive authority in the President.
These values were to be promoted, observes Lowi
(1985)

,

by

the centralization of the executive powers of the
national

government in the presidency.

As the Report states,

.the canons of efficiency require the
establishment of a responsible and effective chief
executive as the center of energy, direction, and administrative management; the systematic organization of all activities in the hands
of qualified personnel under the direction of the
chief executive, and, to aid him in this, the
establishment of appropriate managerial and staff
agencies
.

Thus,

.

the interest in top-level management was the

essential view that led the committee members to all its

recommendations
After the Committee Report was sent to Congress,
Senator James
(NC)

F.

Byrnes

(SC)

and Congressman Lindsay Warren

took on the task of drafting the reorganization bill.

This bill was not exempt from congressional and media

attacks.

In Congress,

Senator Byrd opposed the

reorganization bill for political reasons.

As Arnold

noted, he was disappointed with the President's Committee
for not including him among those who were briefed on the

report.

Senator Byrd later initiated a proposal to

reorganize the executive branch through the Brookings
Institution in Washington, D.C.
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The strongest attack came from the press,
which

developed

a

campaign of distortion and intimidation.

Influenced by anti-administration forces, the press
claimed
that the passage of the reorganization bill
would create a

dictatorship.

As stated in one paper,

"the president

reorganization bill stems directly from the infamous

Brownlow Report which frankly sought an executive
dictatorship"

(Emerich, p

.
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Despite the opposition to the original reorganization
bill,
law,

Congress passed a Reorganization Act in 1939.

This

however, was enacted after two congressional sessions

of failure and included only two of the recommendations of

the Committee Report.

These recommendat ions were:

1)

continuing authority to the President to initiate

reorganization plans; and
the President.

2)

administrative assistants to

Roosevelt used this delegated authority to

issue his reorganization plan No

.

1

of 1939 creating the

Executive Office of the President and moving the Bureau of
the Budget into it.

He also issued Executive Order 8248 to

establish the formal relationships between the Executive
Office,

the White House with its six assistants,

the Bureau

of the Budget and the remaining components of the expanded

presidency (Arnold, 1985)
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Despite repeated attacks and congressional failures,
the President

s

accomplishments.

Committee had several important
The Committee affirmed the principle of

broad presidential authority to initiate executive
reorganization.

This principle changed the practice by

Congress of giving reorganization authority to the
President only in times of war and economic crisis.

It did

not intend to increase the power of the President, but to

strengthen his role as Chief Executive.
states,

it

"advanced the proposition that reorganization

was essentially an executive function"
way,

As Fain (1987)

(p.xxx).

In this

Rohr (1985) notes, Congress' task was "to establish

the departments and then graciously step aside while the

President,

in accordance with the principles of scientific

management, assigns them their activities"

(p.139).

The most important accomplishment was the Committee's

formulation of a new concept of the administrative position
of the Chief Executive.

executive authority.
force,

branch.

It elaborated a new notion of

The president became the centralizing

providing continuous management of the executive
As Lowi

(1985)

says,

Roosevelt put an end to a

congressional -centered government
This approach,

rather than a reflection of the

founders' value orientation,

represented a direct
48

)

adaptation of the notion of

a

presidentally-controlled

executive branch expressed in the managerial perspective.
The subordinate nature of the administrative agencies

entailed,

in the Committee's sense,

the President.

In this way,

strict subordination to

administrative agencies became

instruments of a powerful president.
This emphasis on presidential supremacy represented a

departure from the founders' conception of the separation
of powers.

The President's Committee's interpretation of

the separation of powers relied on stating that it "places
in the President,

and in the President alone, the whole

executive power of the Government of the United States"
(Brownlow report, p.31).

This led the Committee to

associate executive power with the president.
This view, however, overlooked the fact that, by

virtue of constitutional design, the President shares

executive powers with the department heads and Congress.
Rohr explains this point by saying:

"If the president is

the government's chief executive officer, he cannot be at
the same time its sole executive officer.

Chief,

as a

hierarchical term, necessarily implies that subordinates
possess to a lesser degree the power that is the chief's in
the fullest, but not exclusive,

sense"

(

p 40
.

.

Exclusive

attention to control of subordinates by the President was
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intended to justify presidential control over the
executive
branch.

This showed an effort to make the executive the

dominant branch.

The Commi ssio n on Organization of the Executive Rranch of

—[H oover

the Government

Commission)

the enhancement of thp

:

President as manager of the Governmpnt

After World War II, during the Truman Administration,
there was a consensus as to the need to re-evaluate the
state of the executive branch.

In 1947,

Congress

established the Commission on the Organization of the
Executive Branch of the Government (the Hoover Commission)
to make recommendations with regard to how to organize the

executive branch.

This new attempt,

says Emmerich,

stemmed

from the need "to bring into an integrated organization

structure the numerous agencies left in the wake of war and

demobilization (p.82).
President Truman signed the bill that created the

Commission and suggested the appointment of ex-President
Hoover as head of the Commission.

He shared with Congress

interest in considering the state of administration

resulting from the accumulated New Deal, War, and post-war
50

.

programs
Commission.

In 1953,

Congress initiated a second Hoover

But here,

I

examine only the first Commission

because of its emphasis on structural reorganization
of
government agencies and concern with strengthening

executive authority.
The Hoover Commission wrote nineteen reports.

The one

titled "General Management of the Executive Branch" is of
special interest for our purposes.

This report carried the

philosophy of the Commission as to the organization of the
executive branch.

As Ronald Moe

(1982)

assumption in this report was that

a

noted,

the main

reorganization of the

executive branch would give it simplicity of structure,
unity of purpose, and clear lines of executive authority.
Throughout this report, the Commission sought to

strengthen the authority of the President to reorganize the
executive branch.

Its general purpose was clearly stated:

"Establish a clear line of control from the President to
those departments and agencies heads and from them to their

subordinates with correlative responsibility from these

officials to the President, cutting through the barriers

which have in many cases made bureaus and agencies
partially independent of the chief executive"

(U.S.

Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the
Government, General Management of the Executive Branch,
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.

.

Washington; 1949, p.7).

This objective reaffirmed the

Brownlow Committee's purpose of simplifying
the
bureaucratic structure of the Government.

Likewise,

it

extended the intention of the founders to create
a strong
executive
The report on General Management of the Executive

Branch recognized the inability of the President to
assure
sound management.

Its prescription centered around

grouping agencies and departments based on major purposes.
The Commission found that the executive branch was not

organized into

a

workable number of major departments and

agencies which the President can effectively direct..."
(The Hoover Commission Report,

1949,

p.4).

One

recommendation was to give Department Secretaries full
responsibility and authority for the conduct of their
departments.

There should also be delegation of decision-

making in the areas of accounting, budgeting, recruiting
and personnel management to the operating agencies.
Finally,

it recommended staff support to department heads

(Hoover Report, p.7)

The Commission concluded that the

various agencies be consolidated into about one-third of
the present number.

The Commission introduced some changes in the

Executive Office of the President created by President
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Roosevelt.

It recommended a new Office of Personnel
to be

headed by the chairman of the Civil Service
Commission.
It also recommended exemption of congressional
approval for

the heads of the Executive Office of the President.

Another change was the replacement of the Council of
Economic Affairs by the Office of Economic Adviser to be

directed by a single administrator.

Finally,

the Hoover

Commission recommended enhancement of the authority of the
President to initiate reorganization plans in order to

effectuate changes in the government structure (Moe, 1982).
The application of the Gulick's principle of single

administrator and executive leadership is unmistakable.
The other four recommendations were also intended to

strengthen the ability of the President to manage the
government more effectively.

For instance,

the section on

Budget and Accountability proposed a closer relationship

between the Bureau units and the White House.

To deal with

the problem of lack of central direction of activities in
the Federal Government,

the Commission proposed the

establishment of the Office of General Services.

This

office was to be headed by an administrator responsible

directly to the President.

Within this section, the

Department of Treasury was to become the "real fiscal
center of the government"

(Moe,
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p.38)

.

To accomplish this

.

goal,

the Commission proposed the transfer of
agencies and

functions related to fiscal management

(such as the

Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, and the Export-Import Bank)
to the

Department
The Hoover Commission,

like the Brownlow Committe,

strengthened the presidency.

Its major contribution was

the enhancement of the position of the President as manager
of the government.

It also enhanced the position of the

chairman of the Civil Service Commission and facilitated

presidential accountability through the transfer of
agencies to major departments.

The approach was similar to

that of the Brownlow Committe:

"It stressed

accountability"

(Nathan,

1983,
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p.4).

.

The As h Council

i

fl
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Administrative Prp s idpnry

The emphasis on executive
authority and centralization

continued during the Nixon Administration.
the On April

8,

1969,

The purpose of

President Nixon established the

Presidents Advisory Council on Executive
Organization,
known as the Ash Council.

council was to develop

a

comprehensive executive branch reorganization
proposal that
would improve the Presidents capacity
to manage
the

executive branch, and meet service demands
placed upon
government

(Nathan,

1983).

In the words of Nixon:

"...I

have concluded that a sweeping reorganization
of the

Executive Branch of the government is needed to
keep up

with the times and with the needs of the people"
Fain,

1987,

(qtd.

in

p. 5)

This proposition reflects Nixon's concern for

administrative responsiveness to the particular demands of
the political and environmental context in which his

administration worked and to the special demands of the
citizens.

In a broader sense,

the initial intention of

Nixon]ps reorganization initiative was to provide a

government responsive to the people.
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The Ash Council presented an
assumption similar
to that of the Brownlow Committee
and the Hoover

Commission.

The common premise was that the
executive

branch had become

t

o

fragmented due to the proliferation

of programs and agencies.

fragmentation,

agencies to

a

To address this problem of

the Council's prescription was
reduction of

small number of departments, which would

create more centralized lines of authority
within the

executive branch. This approach presupposed the
creation of

broader functional departments and expected to enhance
the
value of efficiency in the management of the federal

Government.

In this way,

the Ash Council employed the

traditional public administration approach to reorganize
the executive branch used by the Brownlow Committee and the

Hoover Commission.
The reorganization proposed by the Ash Council

included three major changes.
executive departments in being:
and Justice.

Second,

departments:

Agriculture,

it would retain four

First,

State,

Treasury, Defense,

it would abolish seven existing

Interior,

Commerce,

Transportation, Labor, Health, Education and Welfare, and

Housing and Urban development.
•

*

new executive departments:

Third,

there would be four

Human Resources, Community

Development, Natural resources, and Economic Affairs.
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Each

"

.

department would be headed by a Secretary assisted
by
staff

a

Nixon based his reorganization on the notion that the

government was organized around methods and subjects rather
than purposes and goals. He considered the lack of unity
in

each department the cause of ineffectiveness in government.
The basic assumption was that organizing a department with
a

given set of purposes to be achieved would assure

accountability of that department.
wrote Fain (1987),

"The new departments,

"would have important new functions,

expanded missions, streamlined authorities, and

strengthened internal organization and management"
Thus,

(p.16).

consolidation of agencies under major departments

based on the functional nature of that agency was the

adopted approach.

The adoption of the principle of

grouping by task prescribed by Gulick is identifiable in
Nixon's reorganization.
The Ash Council's recommendations with regard to the

structure of the government were not only intended to
facilitate an effective management of the federal
Government,

they also followed the strongest emphasis of

both the normative doctrine of the founders and the

prescriptive approach of the managerial perspective:
enhance executive authority.

to

The executive departments
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"were to be directly responsible to the
President,

thereby

assuring a more direct and efficient line of
command

between the President and Cabinet members"

(Fain,

p.4)

Summary
The reorganization efforts examined in this chapter

addressed the inherited problem of

a

president unable to

manage effectively the executive branch.
problem,

they each pursued a common goal:

To deal with this
to strengthen

the managerial role of the president as Chief Executive.

The mechanisms used were consolidation of agencies into few

departments,

integration of units of similar functional

nature, and direction of administrative work by a single

chief executive.

Thus,

these comprehensive attempts to

reorganize the executive branch presented a concrete

application of the normative approaches provided by the
founders' and the managerial perspectives.

The practical

application of these perspectives in the Reorganization of
the Executive Branch of the Government of Puerto Rico is

what the next chapter turns to.
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CHAPTER III

FOUNDING THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE IN PUERTO RICO

This chapter examines the first comprehensive

reorganization of the executive branch of the Government
of
Puerto Rico. This reorganization was initiated in 1949 by
Luis Munoz-Marin,

Puerto Rico.

the first popularly elected Governor of

Through the work of the Commission on

Reorganization of the Executive Branch (the Rowe
Commission)

,

Munoz-Marin came to fix a defect in the system

of separation of powers formally established by the Jones

Act in 1917.

The result was of great importance to the

development of the administrative and political systems in
Puerto Rico.
The Rowe Commission institutionalized an

administrative state with centralization of substantial
authority in the Governor as chief executive, reflective of
the executive model prevalent in the United States.

I

would argue that the theoretical underpinnings that guided
the creation of the American strong executive with

authority over administration shaped the evolution of
modern,

a

strong executive in Puerto Rico, as well.

Particularly, the reorganization of the executive branch
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recommended by the Rowe Commission followed
strictly the
principles of organization, prescribed by the
managerial
perspective, which guided the reorganization of
the

executive branch proposed by the President's Committee
on

Administrative Management

(The Brownlow Committee)

A

.

direct application of the managerial perspective led
the

Rowe Commission to accomodate an instrumental view of

public administration and, as a result, create

a

basis for

the illegitimacy of the administrative state.

Historical Antecedents
During the United States occupation of Puerto Rico
from 1898 until 1949,
weak,

the executive in Puerto Rico was

legislative-dependent, and the embodiment of

political illegitimacy.
century,

During the first half of the 20th

the executive acquired a non-representative nature

in the eyes of the Puerto Ricans,

for he was a North

American appointed by the President of the United States.
Although legally granted administrative authority, in
practice he had limited influence over administration.
This weak and illegitimate nature of the executive in

Puerto Rico originated in two organic acts

passed by the

United States Congress. In 1900, Congress approved the
Foraker Act, the first Organic Act of Puerto Rico.
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This

.

.

law stl Pulated that the President should
appoint the

Governor of Puerto Rico to serve for a period
of four
V tars
with the consent and approval of the United
,

Senate.

States

The cabinet would be composed of six members:

a

secretary, a procurador general, a commissioner
of the
interior,

a

treasurer, and a general auditor.

These

officials were appointed by the President with the
consent
and approval of the Senate.

The Governor appointed by the President was a North

American and citizen of the United States.

The citizens of

Puerto Rico received no consultation and usually no warning

regarding the appointment of an outsider as Governor of
Puerto Rico.

As Goodsell

(1975)

observed,

the appointed

outsider "was a foreigner in every sense of the word; he
thought differently, acted differently, and spoke another
language"

(p.34)

Like the Federal Executive, the Governor

of Puerto Rico was granted the formal authority to appoint

offices, veto legislation,

execute laws, and be the chief

commander of the militia (Ramos de Santiago, 1965)
The Foraker Act also created a bicameral legislature.
The upper legislative chamber was named the Executive

Council,

composed of the six cabinet members and five other

members appointed by the President.

The act specified that

five members of the Executive Council had to be natives of
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Puerto Rico.

The lower legislative chamber was to be

comprised of 35 members elected popularly by the
people of
Puerto Rico every two years.
The lack of executive authority was the result
of

fragmented administrative responsibility.

The Executive

Council, by provision of the Foraker Act, acted as a

council body to the governor with substantial oversight
over administration.

This constituted a legislative

obstacle for the governor's attempts to exert greater
influence over the executive branch.
this way,

powers.

The Foraker Act,

in

departed from the doctrine of separation of

Although it established

assembly,

it

a

bicameral legislative

failed to prevent one branch from becoming the

dominant one by giving the Executive Council both

legislative functions as the upper legislative chamber and

executive functions as

a

council body sharing

administrative supervision with the governor.
Puerto Ricans considered the executive branch as

illegitimate since it was constituted mainly by North
Americans.

Puerto Ricans had limited representation in the

Executive Council.
Rabell

(1993),

This was the result, says Santana-

of a policy of exclusion of Puerto Ricans

from administrative affairs.
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The second organic act was the Jones Act,
approved by

Congress on March

2,

1917.

This legislation seemed to

offer a solution to the lack of executive authority
over

administration.
powers,

Formally establishing the separation of

it eradicated the legislative power of the

Executive Council and created a Senate to be elected

popularly by the people of Puerto Rico.

It also

granted

the Governor the power to appoint the members of the

Executive Council, with the exception of the general

procurador and the Comissioner of Education, with the
consent and approval of the United States Senate. The

Executive Council, hence, became a mere council of the
governor (Ramos de Santiago, 1965)

The council members

were assigned certain administrative duties; however, the
Act did not change the appointive nature of the Governor.

The President continued to appoint a North American as

Governor of Puerto Rico.
the mainland,

Since he was sent directly from

the appointed governor had little or no

knowledge of the political, social and cultural demands of
Puerto Rico

(Wells,

1969)

We can say that the Jones Act perpetuated the

political illegitimacy of the executive created by the
Foraker Act.

The executive was not only unrepresentative

of the interests of the citizens of Puerto Rico,
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but was

.

also controlled by the President of the United
States.

Santana-Rabel 1 states,

As

"The Governor appointed to

administer the colony of Puerto Rico was

a

North American

who was inept, prepotent, and uninterested in solving the

country's problems"

(p.49).

In addition,

the establishment

of the popularly-elected Senate strengthened the

representative character of the legislature.

The main

result was a basis for legislative supremacy over

administration

Legislative Supremacy Over Administration

Like the executive in the United States before the

ratification of the Federal Constitution, the Governorship
in Puerto Rico was subordinate to the legislature.

figure of the governor was weak.

The

The insular legislature,

composed only of Puerto Ricans, exerted a pervasive control
over the executive branch (Goodsell,

1975).

The problem of a weak Puerto Rican executive stemmed

from the dichotomy between formal administrative authority
and its practice.

The Jones Act attempted to strengthen

the administrative authority of the governor by recognizing

him as "the supreme executive power".
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Through the

.

separation of powers,

it granted the

governor the authority

to appoint all the departments heads
and request them to

submit reports directly to him.

Thus,

Jones Act fortified the Governorship"

says Goodsell,

"The

(p.33)

Nevertheless, executive authority over administration
was in reality limited.

The governor's statutory control

of the executive branch was mainly a theory.

As Tugwell,

who was Governor of Puerto Rico from 1941 to
1946, stated:
The Governor of Puerto Rico could not move in any

possible direction, and, if he could, he had not the
wherewithal to do it wisely".

He further contended that

nowhere in the civilized world at the present time,
perhaps,

is there an executive with so little power"

(quoted in Goodsell, p.34)
The subordinate position of the executive can be

understood by looking at pervasive legislative encroachment
on the executive branch.

Two facts support the contention

that there was legislative supremacy over administration.

One is that the fully elective nature of the legislature

gave local politicians ample opportunity to legitimately
use their political influence.

They were, after all,

considered by the people as their only representatives.
A more important factor was that the legislature

controlled the administration through enacting statutes,
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passing appropriations, conducting investigations,
and
confirming gubernatorial appointments (Goodsell, 1975)
Clearly,

the Governor did not have power commensurate with

the formal character of his position.

Although the Jones

Act vested the executive power in the Governor,

it was

merely a formal grant of power that in fact failed to
prevent legislative encroachment.

Let us examine two

mechanisms through which the legislature dominated the

administration
Confirmation of appointments was the mechanism mostly
used by the legislature to control the bureaucracy.

The

common practice in Puerto Rico was "to withhold

confirmation unless the nominee was approved in advance by
the majority party of the upper chamber"

(Goodsell, p.37).

This practice later became known as terna, which consisted
of a list of three names submitted to the governor by the

leaders of the majority party in the legislature for open

positions requiring confirmation.

The list included only

members of the majority party or followers.
The terna forced the governor to select among the

three candidates; otherwise, no confirmation would be
forthcoming.

This practice was successful in guaranteeing

legislative encroachment,

for the candidates "owed their

loyalty to the legislative leadership and not to the
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governor, and thus the majority party had effective
control
of all agencies they headed"

(Goodsell, p.38)

The governor's ability to manage the executive
branch

was also undermined by the establishment of multi-member

boards or commissions.

This approach diminished the

governor's supervisory capabilities since, as Goodsell
notes,

an agency headed by a board is more difficult for

the chief executive to control than one headed by a single

administrator.

Indeed,

the commissions practiced no

accountability either to the governor or the department
heads

(

Santana-Rabell

,

In being completely

1993)

accountable to the legislature, these agencies enjoyed no

administrative discretion by virtue of the statute that
created them.

According to Santana-Rabell, the statutes

were written in such

a

way that they prevented flexibility

in the use of administrative discretion.

This condition

created the need for strengthening the authority of the
executive with regard to administration.

The Elective Governor

In the early nineteen- fort ies

,

a

new cooperative

enterprise to heighten the administrative authority of the
executive was created.

Governor Tugwell and Luis Munoz67

s

Marin (President of the Senate at that time)
initiated
movement that advocated for an elective Governor.

a

Unlike

previous Governors, Tugwell, who was the last imported

Governor of Puerto Rico, was familiar with Puerto Rican
politics.

His appointment as Governor from 1941 to 1946

was the result of his experience as an administrator in

national and municipal government, his work as a White
House confidant in drafting key New Deal measures to

rehabilitate the economy, and his tenure as Secretary of

Agriculture during the F.D. Roosevelt Administration.

Through personal visits to Puerto Rico to examine
agricultural conditions, he became associated with the
island's political problems.

Moreover, his experience at

high levels of administration, says Goddsell, helped him to
acquire an understanding of the role of the chief executive
in a system of separation of powers.

Luis Munoz-Marin

'

rise to political leadership was the product of a

combination of academic and political work.
academic side, he developed

a

On the

strong background in

journalism and law while pursuing college and legal studies
at Georgetown University,

as well as taking journalism

courses in Columbia University.
The New Republic

Democracia

.

,

He wrote for The Nation

and the Baltimore Sun

his father's newspaper,
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,

and edited La

through which he

.

.

published his initial writings on governmental and
social
reforms.

On the political side, he acted as secretary to

his father who was Commissioner Resident of Puerto
Rico in

Washington, D.C.

While working in Washington, he both

received a background in American politics and solidified
his understanding of the political conditions in Puerto
Rico.

In 1932,

after returning from Washington, Munoz was

elected senator-at-large as a member of the Liberal Party.
His strong interest in politics led him to form his own

political organization, the Popular Democratic Party, which
in the 1940 elections won ten of the nineteen seats in the

Insular Senate.
Senate,

a

That year, he became the President of the

position of substantial influence in Puerto Rican

politics
The Tugwell-Munoz enterprise set the basis for the

establishment of the administrative state with the governor
as the chief executive.

Two steps oriented toward this

goal were the control of administration through the

elimination of the terna device of dictating gubernatorial
appointments, and the institutionalization of the Office of
the Governor to provide the governor with staff assistance
in supervising the bureaucracy.

These accomplishments, however, were not enough to

enhance the administrative authority of the governor.
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Tugwell was convinced that popular election was the

necessary condition for the governor of Puerto Rico to
exert effective control over the administration.

said that Tugwell

1

s

It can be

expereince with an elective executive

in the United States led him to consider the same

democratic procedure for the executive in Puerto Rico.

But

this was a reform that required a congressional amendment
to the Jones Act, which was the statutory source of the

executive power in Puerto Rico.
Aware of this congressional requirement, Tugwell

stated in 1943:

"It is my belief that there will not be

one until the Jones Act is rewritten to prescribe as one of
the Governor's qualifications that he must be a citizen of

Puerto Rico as well as of the United States and that he
must be elected by the other citizens of the Island"
(quoted in Goodsell, p.55-56).

expressed Tugwell

's

This communication

belief that Puerto Ricans, in a

democratic system, should be given the right to elect their
own leaders.

He sent President Roosevelt a proposal for an

elective governorship.

The results of this communication

were a presidential message to Congress on March

9,

1943

calling for an amendment to the Jones Act to permit an

elective governor and the creation of the President's

70

.

Advisory Committee to make further legislative
recommendations
The President's Advisory Committee, which included

Tugwell and Munoz as members,

favored strengthening the

administrative authority of the elected governor.

The

basic assumption was that an elective governor would have

effective control over administration.

This assumption

rested on the belief that the illegitimate character of the
executive, a product of its appointive nature, undermined
its ability to exert influence over administration.

fulfill this goal,

To

the committee presented to Congress a

bill providing for an administratively strong governor.

Nevertheless, the Territories and Insular Affairs Committee
in the United States Senate amended the bill,

eliminating

the concept of a powerful chief executive in Puerto Rico
(Goodsell,

1975)

.

Eventually, the bill did not pass the

House Committee on Insular Affairs.
The elective-governor movement did not die after its

Congressional failure in 1943.
after Tugwell

'

s

appointed Jesus

President Truman in 1946,

resignation from the position of Governor,
T.

Pinero,

Governor of Puerto Rico.

a

citizen of Puerto Rico, as

This presidential appointment

constituted a step toward the eradication of the political
illegitimacy of the executive in Puerto Rico.
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But more

important is that in 1947 Congress amended the Jones
Act of
1917 to convert the appointive governorship into
an

elective position.

The main result was the popular

election of Luis Munoz Marin as Governor of Puerto Rico in
1948

.

The importance of the elective governor legislation

resided in that it catalyzed the growth of the
governorship.

Luis Munoz Marin came to reduce the gap

between the formal administrative authority of the governor
and its practice.

Although Tugwell initiated the efforts

to reduce this gap, Munoz successfully institutionalized a

strong governorship thorugh his comprehensive

reorganization of the executive branch.

The Reorganization Act of 1949

Munoz beleived that the weakness of the executive was
its inability to initiate administrative reforms as an

executive function.
administration,

Enhancement of executive priority over

in his view,

required

a

Chief Executive

with authority to exercise this function.
that

Acknowledging

experience has shown the Legislature cannot itself

successfully deal with the problem of modernizing and
improving the organization of the Executive Branch, he said
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m

a press conference:

"The attempts by the Legislature

to reorganize the Executive Branch through
detailed and

specific legislation

March 25, 1949

,

p

.

1

...

have never been fruitful"

(El Mundo,

)

Munoz then became an embodiment of the ideal of

a

strong execu t i ve with admin i strati ve responsibili
ty for the

executive branch.

He initiated the era of modernization of

the executive branch in Puerto Rico and, more

significantly, created a new relationship between the

governorship and administration.
On March 26,

1949, Munoz submitted a project to the

Legislature that recognized reorganization of the executive

branch as an executive function.

Stressing the need for

collaboration between the Executive and the Legislature,
the project advocated for leaving the initiative to

reorganize the executive branch to the Executive.

This

effort embodied Munoz's use of political persuasion to

convince the Legislature of the necessity of delegating

reorganization power to the Executive.

Munoz used the

expression "mutual trust" to refer to the relationship
between the Executive and the Legislature to assure the

acceptance of his reorganization bill and prevent major
procedural conflicts with the Legislature.

He further

called this relationship necessary to strengthen the
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,

.

.

democratic basis of our political system.

.

.making it

efficient in the formulation and execution of programs"

Mundo

,

March

18,

real importance.

1949,

p.l)

(El

The result was a precedent of

The Legislature promptly approved the

bill as Reorganization Act 140, delegating responsibility
to the Executive to organize and ensure administrative

efficiency in the executive branch.
The Reorganization Act, approved on April 28,

1949,

represented the Legislature's acceptance of reorganization
of the Executive Branch as an executive function.

It

granted the governor the power to examine and from time to
time reexamine the organization of all the executive

agencies and departments of the government and to determine
all changes necessary to promote the better execution of

the laws,

and to assure the more effective management of

its departments and agencies through coordination and

consolidation (Reorganization Act 140, article 3).

It also

provided for the establishment of a commission to examine
the executive branch and make recommendations,

stipulating

that reorganization plans were to be submitted to the

Legislature at the beginning of a session and would take
effect the day following the adjournment unless disapproved
by both Houses by concurrent resolution (Reorganization
.

Act

article

5

)
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The Rowe Commission

On June

9,

1949,

Governor Luis Munoz Marin, under the

provisions of the Reorganization Act of 1949, appointed

a

Commission for Reorganization of the Executive Branch of
the Government of Puerto Rico,
In his own words,

composed of seven members.

the members of the commission were

"citizens with ample experience in problems of

administration"

(El Mundo,

February 18, 1949, p.l)

members were North Americans:

James

H.

Three

Rowe, who was the

chairman and had experience in government reorganization at
the federal level,

Louis Brownlow, who presided over the

President's Committee on Administrative Management (The

Brownlow Committee) under the administration of President
Roosevelt, and Arnold Miles, Director of the Research

Division of the United States Bureau of the Budget.
Puerto Rican members were Rafael Pico,

The

President of the

Planning Board, Manuel A. Perez, Director of the Office of
Personnel, Enrique Cordova Diaz, member of the Statehood
Party,

Ortiz.

and the Senators Luis Negron Lopez and Benjamin
The commission became known as the Rowe Commission.

The commission's assignment was limited to problems in
the organization of the executive branch.
to all members,

In a letter sent

Munoz defined their role as to "make
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.

.

.

possible the fulfillment of

a

long and widely-felt need for

improvement in the operation of the Government"
1949,

p

.

2

)

(June

9,

He also advised them of the problem of a

tremendous growth in the size and complexity of the

operations of the Puerto Rican administrative system.
problem,

This

said Munoz, caused confused lines of authority and

responsibility and unsatisfactory responsibility and

accountability of the departments and agencies to the Chief
Executive
To give exclusive attention to these administrative

management problems was the commission's task.

The

commission was to "restrict itself to the organization and

management of the executive branch, avoiding questions of
policy..."

(Report of the Rowe Commission,

Munoz-Amato has observed,
the public policy,

execution"

1949,

p.5).

As

"it was not authorized to alter

just to look for better means for its

(quoted in Dimock,

1951,

p.29)

Thus,

its main

purpose was to study and evaluate the executive branch in
order to find for "the People of Puerto Rico better methods
for the more efficient and economical performance of the

things they wish their government to do for them"
P

•

3

)

(Report,

.

The Commission's language on gubernatorial supremacy

reflects an adherence to both the framers' and the
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managerial perspective.

The creation of the following

norms that guided the commission's work echoed the framers'

orientation toward a strong executive (Report,
1

.

p.

3-4):

The chief executive should be equipped with

authority adequate to match constitutional
responsibility, and with sufficient staff support
to do those things which he must do.
2.

The subordinate officer of the executive branch

should be accountable to the chief executive and,

through the chief executive, to the legislature
and to the people.
3

.

The responsibilities of the subordinates of the

chief executive should be properly located and

directly fixed.
4.

The various organization units should be grouped by

major purpose so as to minimize conflict,
duplication, and overlapping.
5

.

Each activity of the government should be

administered through the form of organization best
suited to achieve its stated objectives.
6.

Good organization should include adequate provision
for planning,

7

.

coordination and control.

Special provision should be made for continuing

attention to efficiency and economy.
77

8.

The Executive Branch as a whole should be
so

organised as to manage with maximum effectiveness
its relations with other branches of the insular

government and with the Federal Government.

Although these norms presuppose a strong Chief
Executive as envisioned by the Founders, unification of the
executive power under the managerial control of the chief
executive as prescribed by the managerial prespective is
unmistakable.

The governor came to play a central role in

managing the administrative institutions.

Thus,

the

governor's role as manager of the executive branch provided
a departure from the Founders'

conception of a Chief

Executive under which the executive of Puerto Rico was
formally established.

The emphasis shifted from faithful

execution of the laws to control and management of the
executive branch.

In departing from the original

conception, the Governor became a more popular figure

rather than a formal one.

This is inherent in the Rowe

Commission's implicit reference to responsiveness to public
opinion.

As it states,

the Governor's task is "to manage

effectively and economically the administrative machinery
of the government,

and reflect the aspirations of the

people of Puerto Rico"

(Report,
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p.3).

This reflects the idea that the Governorship through

executive reorganization has been redesigned to be more

popular than formal

.

This means that the Governor is more

concerned with meeting people's expectations, which he
interprets as a mandate acquired from direct popular
election.

The strong emphasis on control and management is

intended to fulfill this popular mandate.
The Rowe Commission generated several recommendations

intended to enhance the position of the governor as Chief
Executive and to strengthen his capacity to manage the
executive branch effectively.

The most important of these

considered the grouping of agencies and purposes.

The

commission recommended that agencies, programs and
functions be re-grouped, consolidated, reduced or

eliminated to solve the problems of administrative
rationality of the executive branch.

It recommended

reduction in the total number of agencies to
29 separate organizations,

2

abolishing

transfering 24 more into

departments or agencies, and eliminating

directors and

23,

governing boards.

6

other boards of

Furthermore, it

recommended transfering of the Planning Board and the
Office of Personnel into the Office of the Governor.
The Commission also put emphasis on increasing staff

support for the Governor,

for they believed that the
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Governor needed staff support to manage the
executive
branch.
Here is a reflection of the Brownlow Committee's
famous sentence:
"The President needs help".
The staffing
recommendations were divided into staff to the Governor
and
staff to the Governorship.
Recommendations as to
Staff to

the Governor included creating a new post of Executive

Assistant for liaison with the departments and agencies and

organizing an ex-officio Council of Economic Advisers and
an Administrative Assistant for Economic and Social

Programming.

As to Staff to the Governorship,

the

Commission recommended organizing an Administrative
Management Division in the Bureau of the Budget to assist
the Governor in dealing with problems of organization and

administration as they arise.

In addition,

it recommended

removing from the Office of the Governor the Office of

Transportation and the Office of Investigations of Unlawful
Games
The logic behind the Commission's recommendations

rested on notions of strong popular leadership and

centralized executive power.

"Popular" refers to the

source of authority and leadership in public opinion. The

commission's concern with responsiveness to the public's
expectations suggests an informal institutionalization of

gubernatorial leadership in public opinion rather than
80

a

.

formal institutionalization in constitutional character.
In

organizing agencies hierarchically by purpose, the

Commission supported the conception of the Governor as the
embodiment of authority over administration.
^

a

Its call for

Is “headed agencies to promote executive efficiency was

reflection of both the framers' concern for unity and

energy in the executive and the managerial perspective's

principle that all agencies should be headed by
executive.

Thus,

a

single

these organizational recommendations were

devices to strengthen the position of the Governor as

manager of the executive branch.

Like the Brownlow

Committee's recommendations, The Rowe Commission's
recommendations were intended to strengthen top-level

management and institutionalize the doctrine of
inseparability of good administration and strong executive
leadership
The Rowe Commission represented the high point of

development of the Puerto Rican Administrative State.

established

a

It

structure than resembled the organizational

model prevalent in the United States.

The primary feature

was a hierarchical structure with centralization of

substantial authority in the Governor as the Chief
Executive, who coordinates and controls the entire

executive establishment

.

The departments and agencies were
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.

organized by major function, and each became headed by

a

sincfls administrator with strict accountability to the

Governor.

The administrative state thus embodied the

Hamiltonian doctrine of a strong executive.

Equally,

its

establishment was based on the principles of unity of

command and control prescribed by the managerial

perspective
To understand the success of the reorganization agenda

initiated by the Rowe Commission,

it is necessary to

understand the political context within which it sought
realization.

The reforms proposed faced no opposition in

the legislature since 10 of the 11 reorganization plans

submitted by Governor Munoz were approved (De Jesus in
Dimock,

Ortiz

This was the effect,

1952)

(1952),

of

"a

observes Benjamin

complete harmony between the Executive

Branch and the Legislature in the name of greater

administrative efficiency and the establishment of an
authentic democracy in Puerto Rico"
important factor,

says Wells

(1969),

(p.112).

A more

was the leadership of

Munoz Marin as well as his ability and popularity among the
leaders of the majority party in the legislature.

His

years as President of the Senate helped him establish a
strong base of support.

Above all, the legitimacy that

Munoz brought to the Governorship, based on the elective
82

.

nature of his position, contributed to the
success of his

administrative reforms.
Luis Munoz Marin was the first elected governor
who met
the criteria of an administrative state as defined
by the

Rowe Commission.

The Rowe Commission was his instrument to

found an administrative state with a strong executive. He

deserves the title of founder of the Puerto Rican

Administrative State.

Through the work of the Rowe

Commission, his reforms introduced a state of improvement
of the administrative mechanism in Puerto Rico and started

the development of a managerial governorship.

Although

Munoz brought political legitimacy to the Puerto Rican
Governorship, the Commission he appointed to reorganize the

executive branch developed a rhetoric that contributed to
creating a weak legitimacy in the resulting administrative
state

The Rhetoric of the Rowe Report

The Rowe Report provides a rhetoric similar to that of
the Brownlow Report.

The point of connection resides in

the Rowe Report's adoption of the distinction between

policy and administration.

This dichotomy, as discussed in

the first chapter of this study,
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sharply separates two

government operations:
the state,

and

2)

1)

the expression of the will of

the execution of she will of the state.

The Rowe Report defines the task of the executive as

faithfully executing the will of the people through the

effective administration of the public business"

(p.20)

Although this fortifies the position of the governor as
manager of the Executive Branch, it consummates the
ideological separation between policy and administration.
Like the Brownlow Report, the Rowe P.eport supports this

view by describing every executive activity as "executive
management --Planning management, Fiscal management,
"

Revenue Administration and Treasury management, and
Personnel management

(p.21).

There was in the Rowe Report a second rhetorical
emphasis that points to the illegitimacy of the

administrative state.

The report was effective in

establishing a strict accountability to the Governor by the
appointive officials.

Acknowledging the subordinate

position of the administrative institutions to the elective
governor,

the report states,

"The paramount purpose of

general systems of management by the Governor is that he

may extend his management downward throughout the Executive

Branch and be better able to hold all the subordinate units
strictly accountable to him for the proper performance of
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.

their duties

(p.21).

But this emphasis on strict

accountability overlooks an important point. As Rohr
(1985)
contends,

the administrative institutions are also

subordinate to the legislature because execution is

ultimately subordinate to expression.

Thus,

the

administrative agencies have more than one constitutional
superior to whom they must respond.
In introducing the strict accountability to the

executive,

the Rowe Report not only supported the

pol icy /administration dichotomy but also accommodated an

instrumental view of Public Administration.

The Public

Administration was to be an instrument of the executive and
was intended to be apolitical.

Appointed officials were to

be accountable to the executive for "clearly defined and

fixed responsibilities,

for which the Governor is in turn

responsible to the Legislative Assembly and to the people"
(Rowe Report,

p.141)

.

This is a language that put

sovereignty in the Governor and not in the people.

Through

institutionalizing this instrumental view, the Rowe Report
interpreted the notion of representation as endemic only to
elected officials.

As Rohr would say,

it ignored

"the fact

that some offices are filled by election and others by

appointment says nothing about the connection between the

people and the occupant of

a

particular office"
85

(p.80)

elective and appointive officers derive their

authority from the same source, the Constitution.

Thus,

the rhetoric of the Rowe Report overlooked the fact that

appointive officials, because of constitutional design,
possess a formal virtue that enables them to act, in case
of disagreement between their constitutional superiors,
a

as

safeguard against arbitrary power.
This approach of strict accountability to the Governor

represented a direct application of the notion of an
executive branch controlled by the Chief Executive,

expressed in the managerial perspective.

With this

emphasis on executive supremacy, the Rowe Report departed
from the doctrine of the separation of powers.

The

Report's intention to place in the Governor the whole

executive power led itself to associate executive power

with the Governor.

This view, as Rohr would say, overlooks

that the Governor, by constitutional design,

shares

executive powers with the department heads and Legislature.
Therefore,

the Report's exclusive attention to control of

subordinates by the Governor attempted to justify executive

supremacy over the executive branch.
It is clear that the Rowe Commission called for a break

in legislative control over administration.

Its main

contribution was the formulation of a new concept of the
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administrative position of the Governor.

Resting on the

assumption that the interests of good administration and
the Governor's interests were identical,

it led to a

"modern" position on gubernatorial authority over

administration.

Therefore, we can attribute to the Rowe

Commission the initiation of modern comprehensive
reorganization agenda in Puerto Rico.
The founding of the Administrative State in Puerto Rico

was a reflection of the theoretical underpinnings that

guided the evolution of the American Administrative State.
The governor's administrative capacity was a priority for
the members of the Rowe Commission.

Committee,

Like the Brownlow

the Rowe Commission connected its work to the

needs of the Chief Executive.

The Rowe Report was

Federalist in its prescription of a rigorous and united
executive.

However,

its understanding of sound

administration as strict accountability of appointive
officials to the Governor and its conception of

representation as a quality only of elective officials
created a basis for a weak legitimacy of the administrative
state.

The next chapter turns to the application of these

theoretical underpinnings to the most recent reorganization
of the Executive Branch in Puerto Rico and examines the
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continuity of the problem of legitimacy of the

administrative state.
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CHAPTER IV

EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION UNDER GOVERNOR ROSELLO

This chapter examines the most recent reorganization
of the executive branch of the Government of Puerto Rico,

initiated by Governor Rosello in 1993

.

Although attempted

44 years after the first executive reorganization in 1949,
it

shows an approach to organization similar to that

employed in the Rowe Report.

The managerial perspective,

which advocates a managerial role for the chief executive
based on control and strict accountability, was influential
in the development of this reorganization proposal.

In

adopting this perspective's dominant principles of
organizations,

just as the Rowe Commission did,

this

reorganization perpetuates the instrumental view of public

administration implied in the managerial perspective.

A Brief view of executive reorganizations from 1968 to 1993

The need for reorganization of the Executive Branch of
the Government of Puerto Rico has been the subject of

various commissions during the second half of the 20th
century.

Santana-Rabell

(1993)
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identifies five

.

reorganizations since the Rowe Commission in 1949.

A

detailed examination of these reorganizations is not
within
the scope of this study.

Nevertheless, their common

emphasis on a strengthened executive is worth examining.

Under the provisions of the Reorganization Act of
Governor Luis

1968,

A.

Ferre established the Commission on

Reorganization of the Executive Branch.
Commission,

Unlike the Rowe

this commission did not attempt a comprehensive

reorganization of the executive establishment.

It

limited

ins work to seeking administrat ive rationality through

coordination and integration of functions and agencies.

It

focused on the mechanisms of consolidation, restructuring
and transfer of agencies into major departments as a means
to facilitating the superintendence of the executive

branch
In 1976,

during the Hernandez-Colon Administration,

the legislature approved a new reorganization act that

superseded the previous one.

The importance of this

legislation to our purposes is that it centralized the
powers of reorganization completely in the Governor and

limited the role of the legislature to merely instrumental
(

Santana-Rabell

)

.

Governor Hernandez-Colon, under the

provisions of the reorganization act, appointed a new

Commission for Reorganization of the Executive Branch.
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The

.

most important objective of this commission
was to improve
the instruments and mechanisms of coordination,
supervision
and control of the executive branch by the
Governor.
One
of its guiding norms was to provide the
Governor with

managerial techniques for the planning, integration,
supervision and evaluation of administrative activities

within the executive branch.
reasons Santana-Rabell

,

Thus,

this reorganization,

returned to the emphasis on

centralization of executive authority expressed in the Rowe
Report

With the election of Romero-Barcelo as new Governor of
Puerto Rico in 1977, the Reorganization Act of 1976 was

amended to create

a

new Commission on Reorganization.

The

purpose of this commission was to study and evaluate the
integration, composition,

functions, and procedures of the

executive branch, and make the necessary recommendations to

effectuate an integral organization.

Its main mission was

to produce an organizational structure with centralization

of substantial authority in the Governor.

The assumption,

states Santana-Rabell, was that the disarticulate growth of
the Executive Branch has undermined the capacity of the

governor to supervise, coordinate and control the

multiplicity of government organizations.

Therefore,

recommended the reduction of the number of executive
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it

departments to 14 in order to facilitate the supervision
and coordination of the executive branch by the Governor.

After the Commission of Reorganization of 1981, two
other attempts to reorganize the executive branch were

initiated by private sector organizations.

In 1985,

the

Subcommittee on Reorganization of the Government of the

Committee for the Economic Development of Puerto Rico,
Inc.,

presented its Study of the Organization and Function

of the Executive Branch of the Government of Puerto Rico.

The paramount purpose was to study the organization of the

government and propose strategies for the modernization and
improvement of the government structure.

Unlike the

previous reorganization efforts, it proposed the
improvement of the quality of management and administrative
personnel, revision of the current systems, methods and

administrative procedures, and strengthening of middle
management as the best way to enhance the capacity of the

Governor to guide and control the executive branch.
The second reorganization attempt by a private sector

organization was directed by the Committee on Efficiency
and Decentralization of the Governmental Activity,

a

subcommittee of the Commerce Chamber of Puerto Rico.
report proposed the reduction of the size of the

government, elimination of excessive management and
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Its

.

administrative positions, and dispersion of
governmental
activity to the rural areas. According to

the committee,

the complexity of the government organization
makes it

practically impossible for the chief executive to
guide and
supervise directly the extensive and diverse gamut
of

government entities that hierarchically respond directly
to
the Office of the Governor (qtd. in Santana-Rabell

,

p.150).

This effort, however, had no impact on the reorganization
of the executive branch.

The failure of private sector

organizations to effect any changes to the structure and

organization of the executive branch turned the initiative
of executive reorganization back to the Governor.

Reorganization Act of

1

QQ3

Like previous Governors, Governor Rosello incorporated

reorganization planning as

a tool

for increasing his

managerial control of the executive branch.

platform of the New Progressive Party (NPP)

In the
,

called the

Leadership of Ideas, he described reorganization planning
as an activity "to transform the role of the government as

one

'paternalistic' and provider to one

'facilitator'

.
.

.

"

(p.10)

The platform presented six main

strategies of his reorganization:
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1)

to create 16

.

.

umbrella departments in which agencies, programs and
o f f i t s s of similar functional natures will be grouped;

to transfer functions to the private sector;

3)

2)

to refocus

priorities in public budgeting and reduce public cost;

4)

to decentralize governmental activities that limit

initiative on the private sector and preclude economic
development; and

6)

to strengthen the control of the

government over public corporations and their processes of

development of policies
this way,

(Political Platform, p.ll).

In

the political platform set the arena for Governor

Rosello's initiative in proposing a new reorganization act
that would grant him powers to reorganize the executive

branch
On January 12,

1993,

Governor Rosello sent to the

Legislature the initial project on reorganization
requesting delegation of power to restructure the
government.

After being referred to the Senate, the

majority approved it as the Project of the Senate no.

4.

This project promised a comprehensive administrative reform
of the government based on the integration,

elimination and

consolidation of executive agencies and departments under
major umbrella departments

(

Nuevo Dia

,

January

7,

1993)

Governor Rosello acknowledged that, as of January 1993, the
executive branch was comprised of 54 public corporations,
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.

51 executive agencies,

8

departments created by law, 11

offices in the Office of the Governor, and 14 support

offices in the Fortaleza (the Governor's House)

The

.

reorganization project proposed to reduce the support
agencies to nine and the offices in the Office of the

Governor to five, consolidate 51 government agencies to
and integrate the 56 public corporations to 47.

42,

This

arrangement of umbrella departments, said the Governor,
"will provide flexibility, better communication and

coordination in the implementation of public policies to
the benefit of the people"
Thus,

(

Nuevo Dia

.

August 22, 1993)

an excessive growth of the government justified the

Rosello Administration's case for reorganization.
To understand the fate of this bill,
to look at the controversy that arose.

it is important

Unlike the

Reorganization Bill Governor Munoz-Marin submitted to the
Legislature in 1949, the Project of the Senate no.
strong criticism.

4

faced

The fact that the proposal was reviewed

by a NPP-controlled legislature accelerated its approval,

without a careful examination of its implications.
The passage of this project stimulated strong

criticism from diverse social and political sectors.
can contend,

as Diclerico

(1979)

One

would say, that the

Executive will face opposition every time he attempts a
95

reorganization of the Government through the transfer,
abolition, or consolidation of government agencies.
says,

As he

reorganizations can not avoid the political context

in which they are attempted"

(p.

123).

Nevertheless, under

Munoz Marin the attempt to reorganize the executive branch
faced no opposition.

The need of a strong executive after

years of legislative encroachment, besides the popularity
of Munoz-Marin among party members,

justified the

reorganization initiative.
The criticism pointed to the constitutional

implications of the Project of the Senate no.

The main

4.

claim was that the approved reorganization proposal

threatened the system of separation of powers.

The basic

point was not that the legislation granted the Governor

ample authority to create, consolidate and abolish agencies

and departments, but that it contained provisions that

precluded the Legislature from amending the project or the
reorganization plans, and required explanation for
legislative rejection, if this were the action taken
Dia

.

February

1,

1993,

p.5).

(

Nuevo

The assumption behind this

proposed legislative approval process was that it would
bring flexibility to the whole reorganization initiative.
Other criticisms emphasized that the project lacked

dispositions to protect the job of employees of the
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agencies to be consolidated, transferred or abolished, and
that the project did not include a three-party commission

composed of experts in public administration

January 12, 1993).

(

Nuevo

Pi a

.

These criticisms led the presidents of

the Senate and the House of Representatives, Roberto Rexach

Benitez and Zaida Hernandez, respectively, to review the

proposed project and present
no.

4.

Eventually,

a

Substitute to the

P.

of S.

this substitute became the

Reorganization Act of 1993.
To restore the confidence of the diverse social and

political sectors, the Reorganization Act introduced
several changes.

A difference with the Reorganization Act

of 1949 is that it created a Legislative Joint Commission

on the Reorganization Plans of the Executive

Reorganization, to be composed by nine senators and nine

representatives of which no less than three should be from
the minority.

Instead of studying the organization of the

Executive Branch and making recommendations, the role of
the commission was to conduct a preliminary analysis of the

reorganization plans submitted by the Governor.

It was

also to hold public hearings in order to adopt a report for

submission to the Senate and the House of Representatives.

The Reorganization Act also stipulated that within
five days from the submission of each plan,

the legislative

bodies would meet as a Committee of the Whole, separately,
to analyze the reorganization plans before them,

as well as

the Report of the Joint Commission on the same plan.

these sessions,

In

there would be amendments to the plan by

either House; and,

if approved by the Committee of the

Whole of each House,

would be sent to the Joint

it

Commission which would render a final report to be
submitted for

a

vote in each legislative body.

Within

seven days of receiving the amended plan, the Joint

Commission would adopt

a

final report that would be

submitted to the House and Senate for its approval by roll
call and without any amendments.
bodies,

Once approved by both

the plan would be sent to the Governor for his

review and signature or veto.

Santana-Rabell

,

Nevertheless, argues

although this procedure tends to safeguard

the constitutional balance and allows for participation by
the minority in the Legislature,

it

fails to include other

sectors of the community.

Another change was the exclusion of the public
corporations from the structural reform.

This means,

states Santana-Rabell, that "the most powerful, complex and
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important sector of the public administration will
not be

included in the process of reorganization"

(p.

157).

One element of similarity between the Reorganization
Act of 1993 and the Reorganization Act of 1949 is the

emphasis on efficiency, responsiveness, and executive
leadership.

This reflects a continuity in the application

of the managerial prescription of executive leadership as a

principle of executive organization.
The notion of executive leadership is provided in

Article

3

of the Reorganization Act.

the governor the

This article assigns

responsibility of assessing the

organization of the executive branch and determining the
changes necessary for a good government.
Act enables the Governor,

In section

4,

the

through the creation of

reorganization plans, to transfer, create, abolish, and
consolidate totally or partially agencies of the executive
branch.

Thus,

the Reorganization Act vests in the Governor

the role of Chief Executive and defines reorganization

planning as an executive function.
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Scope of the Reoraani?.atinr

Under the provisions of the Reorganization Act,

Governor Rosello took initiative over the reorganization of
the executive branch.

The proposed reorganization focused

on how to reform the structure.

He submitted 11

reorganization plans to the Legislature, which provided the
scope and purpose of the reorganization.

Commission,

As in the Rowe

these plans responded to the premise that,

in

order to attain government efficiency and sound management,
the executive branch should be reduced to a small number of

departments.

Here lies an application of Gulick's

principle that all agencies should be consolidated under
single chief executive.

a

The purpose of the plans was quite

similar to that of the plans under the reorganzat ion of
to increase the effectiveness of the management of

1949:

government programs and agencies.
The reorganization plans embody the traditional

approach of umbrella departments. As Govenor Rosello says,
under each umbrella department will be grouped multiple

agencies with similar characteristics
1993)

.

(

Nuevo Dia

,

August

This approach advocates for the consolidation of

administrative agencies with similar functional natures
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2,

.

.

under the same major department.
approach,

says Fain

(1987),

The rationale of this

is that each department will

have important new functions, expanded missions,

streamlined authorities, and strengthened internal

organization and management
The composition of the new departments, briefly

described below, evidences the reorganization's adoption of
the traditional-managerial emphasis on executive

centralization

Commission of Public Security and Protection
In addition to absorbing the Department of Police, the
Fire Department and the central Agency of Civil Defense of
Puerto Rico, the Commission of Public Security and
Protection would acquire important components from Health
and Natural resources.
From Health it would transfer the
Auxiliary Secretariat of Medical Emergencies (including its
budget, personnel, resources and equipment) to the Fire
Department.
From Natural resources it would transfer the
Planning Program for Mitigating Natural Risks. The
Commission on Public Security and Protection will be headed
by a Commissioner to be appointed by the Governor among the
Chief of the Fire Department, the Director of the Central
Agency of Civil Defense, and the Superintendent of the
Police Department.
Each will be directly responsible to
the Commissioner (Reorganization Plan no. 1; Executive
Order-1994-56
)

.

Department of Justice
The Department of Justice would receive the Institute
of Forensic Sciences to provide technical and scientific
It would
support in carrying out criminal investigations.
abolish the Board of Directors of the Institute and
transfer its functions to the Secretary of Justice. The
Department of Justice would also transfer to the Department
of State the Real State Examination Board, including its
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resources and personnel.
In addition, it would include the
following components:
Board of Forfeitures, the offices of
the Assistant Secretary for Human Resources,
Administration, Registration of Property, Family and
Children Affairs, Crime, Comptroller Affairs, Dispute,
Counsel, and Attorney General; the Bureau of Special
Investigations, the Executive Board SIJC, the Commission of
Civil Rights, and the System of Information on Criminal
Justice.
Each of these agencies would directly responsible
to the Secretary of Justice (Reorganization Plan no. 2;
Nuevo Dia September 12, 1993).
.

Department of Correction and Rehabilitation
The Department of Correction and Rehabilitation
absorbs the Correctional Penal System, created in 1988,
Juvenile Institutions and the Corporation of Training
Businesses.
The Directors of these agencies will be
directly responsible to the Secretary of Rehabilitation and
Correction (Reorganization Plan no 3 approved, December 3,
.

1993

)

,

.

Department of Natural and Environmental Resources
The Department of Natural and Environmental Resources
will be composed of six main agencies:
thg Administration
of Natural Resources, which includes all existing programs
of the Department of Natural Resources and integrates the
Office of the Commissioner on Navigation, the Board of
Guards of Natural Resources of Puerto Rico; the Department
of Solid Waste (the Board of Directors is abolished and its
functions transferred to the Secretary)
the Administration
of Energy Affairs; the Advisory Council on Energy, and the
Advisory Council on Natural and Environmental Resources
(Reorganization Plan no. 4, approved December 9, 1993).
;

Department of Agriculture
The Department of Agriculture will be composed of the
the Administration for Farming
following agencies:
of Puerto Rico (created by Article
Development
Services and
transfer the
Plan
no.
5);
5 of Reorganization
the Authority of
Development;
Administration of Agrarian
and the
Insurance;
Soil; the Corporation of Agricultural
will
components
These
Corporation for Rural Development.
Agriculture
respond directly to the Secretary of
(Reorganization Plan no. 5).
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Department of labor and Human Resources
The Department of Labor and Human Resources would be
organized around the following main agencies: the
Administration of Labor Rights, Board of Volunteers to the
Service of Puerto Rico, the Board on Minimum Wage, and the
existing programs of the Department.
The activities
performed by these public organisms will be coordinated by
the Secretary of Labor and Human Resources (Reorganization
Plan no. 6, approved, May 4, 1994)
.

Department of Citizens' Rights
The Department of Citizens' Rights would absorb
components from the Office of the Governor. Transfers
include the Commission of Women's Affairs, the Office of
Youth Affairs, the Office of People with Disabilities
Affairs and the Office of the Attorney for Veteran Affairs.
These agencies will be subordinate to the Secretary of
Citizens' Rights in the development of public policy and
coordination of operations (Reorganization Plan no 7
approved, February, 1994; Executive Order-1994-23;
Executive Order-1994-12).
.

,

Department of Finance
The Department of Finance continues as the Office of
the Commissioner of Financial Institutions and the Office
of the Commissioner of Insurance.
Transfers include the
powers, personnel, equipment, records, and budget of the
Office of the Inspector of Cooperatives to the Office of
Commissioner of Financial Institutions; the Office of the
Inspector of Cooperatives and its functions not related to
the savings, credit and insurance Cooperatives to the
Administration of Cooperative Development; the Corporation
of Insurance to Actions and Deposits of the Cooperative of
Saving and Credit; the Administration of the Equine
Industry and Sport; and the Office of Industrial Tax
Exemption (Reorganization Plan no. 8, approved, June 2,
1994)
.

Department of Economic Development and Commerce
The Department of Economic Development and Commerce
would absorb the following departments and agencies: the
Department of Tourism, the Administration of Commercial
Development (functions related to the establishment and
development of small businesses, and promotion of foreign
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.

commerce and exports), the Administration of Economic
Development, the Corporation of the Development of
the
Movie Industry of Puerto Rico, the Administration of
the
Equine Industry and Sport.
In addition, it would create
the Committee on Economic Development to be composed
of the
Secretary and the Chiefs of the different agencies. The
Directors of these agencies will be directly responsible to
the Secretary (Reorganization Plan no 9 approved, June
22,
.

19 94

)

,

.

Department of Family
In addition to absorbing the Department of Social
Services, created in 1968, the Department of Family
integrates the following agencies:
the Administration of
Family and Children, the Administration of Social-Economic
Development and the Administration of Vocational
Rehabilitation. Transfers include the Office of Child
Services and Criminal Development (SENDES) to the
Administration of Families and Children, the Loiza
Institute for Blind Children and Youth, and the Program of
Shoe Distribution to the Department of Education
(Reorganization Plan no. 11, approved, March 23, 1995
Nuevo Dia April 1, 1995; Nuevo Pi a April 6, 1994)
;

,

.

.

The reorganization plans summarized above reflect

themes that were present in the Rowe Report.

Recurrent

themes include that the reduction of the number of
agencies, organization of departments around broad goals,

and grouping of administrative agencies with related

functional natures together in one major department.

The

basic assumption is that this arrangement would preclude

interagency competition and integrate functions

effectively

Through the reorganization plans, the proposed
reorganization unmistakably employs the managerial
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perspective's prescription of organization by
consolidation.

It adopted the assumption that effective

organizational design is assured by consolidating agencies

with similar functions under the same major department.
But the important point is that this approach is not

innovative since it reflects the same approach applied by
the President's Committee on Administrative Management,

which based the organizational structure of the executive
branch of the Government of the United States on the
process involved or the type of work to be performed.

With organization by consolidation, the reorganization
proposed by Governor Rosello anticipated the benefit of
less confusion and duplication when related programs are

placed in two or more agencies.

For example,

of the proposed Department of Finance,

in the case

it was determined

that the Office of Tax Exemption and the Administration of

Equine Industry and Sport would not be placed under this

department because of incompatibility with the functions
and goals of the Department of Finance
1994)

(

Nuevo Dia

.

May 27,

It can be inferred that through the mechanism of

consolidation of agencies of similar functional natures
under one major department, the proposed reorganization
aimed at strengthening the capacity of the Governor to
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.

manage the multiple programs carried out by the executive
branch
The interest in consolidating agencies by functional

nature responded to the interest in enhancing executive

accountability through a strengthened top-level management
structure based on the traditional principle of one single

executive for each department and a sole chief executive.
In this way,

the variety of programs that were administered

by several agencies became under the control of the

Governor.

This reflected the tendency toward the creation

of an integrated executive,

as prescribed by the managerial

perspective
The rationale of the proposed reorganization by

consolidation is that the Government should be organized
according to each department's major goal

(basic mission).

Similarity in functional nature is the controlling
criterion.

The implication is not necessarily that the

department would be big in size; the size would depend on
the broad mission and the consolidated number of agencies.
For example,

the Department of Citizens' Rights is given

the broad mission of protecting the rights and interests of
a certain sectors,

and youth.
clientele,

such as women, veterans, handicapped,

Although each agency attends to

a

different

they were accorded the same purpose.
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This shows a connection with President Nixon's

reorganization proposal in 1971.
has stated,

As Alan L. Dean

(1981)

"President Nixon attempted to restructure the

executive branch along major purpose lines when he proposed
the abolition of seven domestic departments and their

regrouping into four departments concerned with community
development, human resources, natural resources, and

economic affairs"

(p.136).

Nixon's executive

reorganization emphasized reassembling the executive branch
on the bases of similarity of functions.

In a presidential

message to Congress, he presented this approach to
organization:

"The key to a new understanding is the

concept that the executive branch of the Government should
be organized around basic goals"
P 15
•

)

(quoted in Fain,

1987,

.

Through the reorganization plans the proposed

reorganization was also justified in terms of efficiency in
the discharge of public services and decentralization of

executive activities.
of 1993,

As stated in the Reorganization Act

one of the objectives of the reorganization is "to

improve the level of effectiveness and efficiency of the
government"

(p.l).

Governor Rosello envisioned

decentralization of executive activities by delegating
authority to the Secretaries and charging them with larger
107

.

complex functions as a result of the consolidation of
agencies.

This managerial approach carried the assumption

that strengthening departmental management would produce a

more systematic and coherent administration.

Nevertheless,

decentralization might not always produce the expected
results.

As Fain asserted,

"Experience suggests that there

are many pitfalls in the path to effective

decentralization.

Without field officers who are properly

selected, well -trained,

thoroughly conversant with

departmental affairs, and prepared to assert their

delegated authority in full measure, decentralization may
not mean much"

(p.22)

It is important to note that this reorganization is

not immune to contradictions.

One contradiction arises

from the fact that the size of the government is increasing

despite the stated purpose of reducing its size.

This is

confirmed by Representative Anibal Acevedo, who conducted
an analysis of the proposals to consolidate government

agencies under major departments.

He argued that the

Office of the Governor has grown between 1993 and 1995.
the one hand,

states Acevedo,

On

the Governor proposes to

transfer certain agencies located in the Office of the

Governor to the new Department of Citizens' Rights.
other hand, he creates three new offices:
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On the

the Office of

Communications, the Secretariat of Organization and

Governmental Politics, and the Secretariat of Strategic
development

(

Nuevo—Dia, February 21,

1995)

.

Santana-Rabell

agrees with Acevedo in stating that the Umbrella

Departments create an additional hierarchical level since
the agencies transferred to these departments keep their

own boss.

This is a contradiction with the intention of

reducing the bureaucratic structure.

The basic implication

is that comprehensive accountability of government agencies

as Wilson

is,

way

.

(1989)

states,

impossible in any enduring

What is possible is to make them alert to the

administration's preferences by placing loyal and competent
subordinates in charge of making decisions.

This lead us

to consider the effect of this reorganization on the

legitimacy of the administrative state.
The Rosello reorganization did not attempt to identify
or address the problem of illegitimacy of the

administrative state.

There was a clear intention to

institutionalize an absolute subordination of the public

bureaucracy to the Governor.

According to the Director of

the Office of Management and Budget,

the main purpose of

the reorganization was "to focus on the integration and

design of a structure within the executive branch which
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would create new departments directly responsible to the
governor"

(

Nuevo Dia

.

August

2,

1993).

This statement provides continuity to the emphasis on

strict accountability by administrative agencies to the

Governor expressed in the Rowe Report

.

The structural

arrangement it presupposes is proposed in the name of
e ffi c i®ncy.

This,

however,

reflects an exclusive focus on

the relation of management to the organization of

administrative institutions and the role of the Governor as
manager.

The managerial perspective's proposition of

executive supremacy over administration and its consequence
of an instrumental character of the public administration
is thus identifiable in this reorganization.

The proposed reorganization, with its emphasis on

consolidation, anticipates

over the executive branch.

a

greater executive oversight
This view reflects the

managerial doctrine embodied in the Rowe Report that

presupposes an inseparability of good administration and
executive leadership.

The reorganization reaffirms the

Rowe Report's emphasis on establishing a strong executive

with substantial authority over the executive branch and
responsibility for administrative management. Therefore,
the reorganization not only enhances the position of the

no

Governor as Chief Executive, but also perpetuates his
role
as manager of the executive branch.

Ill

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS

The emergence of the notion of a strong
executive in

Puerto Rico is based on a direct association with
two

theoretical arguments that embody the view of executive

leadership of both the Founders and the managerial
perspective.

These theories, and their practical

application in the context of the United States, guided the
development of a strong executive in Puerto Rico.

The

Hamiltonian chief executive characterized by unity and
energy was the vision of the Founders.

The innovative

aspect of the Puerto Rican executive was to combine this

vision with the practical experience in the United States

with a weak executive in order to legitimize
executive.

a

strong

The managerial perspective contributed the idea

that governmental efficiency depended on the centralization
of substantial authority in the chief executive as center of

direction and administrative management.
The direct application of these theoretical

perspectives to the effort to reorganize the executive
branch of the Government of Puerto Rico in 1949 contributed
to this effort's success in bringing significant change to

the island's political and administrative systems.

On the

political side, the Governor became the embodiment of
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political legitimacy

1

and executive leadership.

The central

point here is that this application healed
a long-lasting
defect in the systems of separation of
powers established by
the Jones Act in 1917.
it put an end to legislative

dominance over administration.

acquired

a

As a result,

the Executive

balance with the legislature with regard to his

relation with the public bureaucracy.

Considering the

nature of the subordination of the executive branch
to the

legislature before 1949 in Puerto Rico, Governor Munoz-Marin
was right in initiating a comprehensive reorganization
to

strengthen the role of the Governor as Chief Executive.
Besides their political impact, these theoretical

perspectives oriented the evolution of the administrative
state in Puerto Rico.

The emphasis on strict executive

centralization dominated the organization of administrative
institutions.

The main feature, product of the managerial

perspective, was a strictly hierarchical structure of

authority with the Governor at the top.

A level of

accountability to the Governor, and not only to the

The term political legitimacy, in this sense, refers to the
significant change in the selection of the Governor of Puerto Rico
from presidential appointment to popular election.
As stated
before, the Governorship in Puerto Rico was the embodiment of
political illegitimacy since the executive was a North American,
appointed by the President with the consent and approval of the
Senate, unrepresentative of the interests and concerns of the
people of Puerto Rico.
Hence, the political legitimacy of the
Governorship in Puerto Rico originated in the popular election of
the Governor.
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legislature, was instituted.
thrust

This arrangement followed the

that strict centralization and a narrow span
of

control would give direction and ensure accountability

within the executive branch.

Although both the Founders

'

and the managerial

perspective's emphasis on executive organization were
applied to the practice of reorganization planning in Puerto
Rico,

the managerial perspective was more influential in

determining the character of the Governor as Chief
Executive.

Reorganization planning under Governor Munoz-

Marin subsumed the modern, managerial presidency perspective

with its strong emphasis on the chief executive's
administrative supremacy.

Thus,

this perspective was an

integral part of the development of the concept of an

enhanced managerial governorship.
The Rowe Commission,

in this regard,

indicated the

importance of this perspective as a discourse which is

explicitly concerned with executive leadership.

The

Commission called for an exclusive gubernatorial control of
executive reorganization and argued for the unification of
the executive power under the managerial control of the

Governor as strategies to achieve executive supremacy in
Puerto Rico.

This expressed an adoption of the Brownlow

Committee's emphasis on the necessity for a strong

managerial executive, which led to an expansion of the
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expectations of gubernatorial responsibility to
include the
management of the administrative agencies.
This emphasis on gubernatorial management
was

reaffirmed in the reorganization of the executive
branch
initiated by Governor Rosello in 1993.

Administration did not produce

Although the Rosello

a report,

its reorganization

plans served as the documentary source for the continuity
of
the emphasis on executive centralization.

The critical analysis of these reorganizations relied
on the fact that while the Rowe Commission created the

problem of illegitimacy of the administrative state", the
Rosello reorganization perpetuated it.
a basis

The Rowe Report set

for the illegitimacy of the administrative state

based on strict accountability of government agencies to the
Governor.

This was a considerable consequence of the

application of the managerial perspective to the case of
reorganization of the executive branch.

In adopting this

perspective's dominant principles of organization, the
report incorporated into the Puerto Rican administrative

system the instrumental view of Public Administration.

One

can argue that the members of the Rowe commission were aware
of this implication.

The fact that Louis Brownlow and James

The term illegitimacy with regard to the administrative state
refers to the view, grounded on orthodox bases, that administrative
agencies are instruments of a strengthened executive rather than
institutions of government.
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H.

Rowe,

two advocates of the managerial perspective, had

considerable influence in the work of the commission
supports the contention that the Rowe Commission's intention
was precisely to make the public bureaucracy subject to

absolute subordination to the Governor as Chief Executive.
The Rosello reorganization, like previous

reorganizations, makes no effort to identify this problem of

illegitimacy and offers no solution.

In fact,

it justifies

strict subordination of administrative agencies to executive

authority in the Governor, through the establishment of the
umbrella departments with direct accountability to the
Governor.

Thus,

the Rosello reorganization, while enhancing

the managerial role of the Governor,

contributes to develop,

as in the case of the Rowe Commission,

an illegitimacy of

the administrative institutions that confines these

institutions to mere instruments of passive implementation
or execution of the laws.
I

believe that a managerial governorship is appropriate

for the effective coordination of executive agencies.

It

gives the Governor greater opportunity to establish

managerial cohesion within the executive branch and ensure
the faithful execution of the laws.

However,

its emphasis

on control and strict subordination of administrative

agencies to the chief executive ignores the political nature
of the Public Administration.
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The exercise of absolute

control of executive activities is not consistent
with

democratic values since it hinders the formal virtue
of
public administrators to contribute to governance.

The

managerial perspective carries

a

language that delegitimates

the administrative state in terms of reducing its role
to an

instrument of a strengthened executive.

The experience of

executive reorganization in Puerto Rico, based on the

principles of organization prescribed by the managerial
perspective, has accorded the public administration this

instrumental character.
The history of executive reorganizations in Puerto Rico
does not speak of administrative agencies as institutions of

government. Administrative agencies have been considered, in
great measure,

instruments of the Chief Executive. In both

the Rowe Report and the reorganization plans of the Rosello

Administration resides a discourse that puts exclusive
attention on the role of management in executive

organization and not on the role of public administration in
governance.

Focusing on how to organize the executive

agencies so that they become more responsible and directly

accountable to the Governor, this discourse has ignored the
importance of the doctrine of an energetic administration in
the execution of the laws.

This is the importance that the

Founders accorded to administration.
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This ignorance

produces a lack of sense of legitimacy of the role
effective

administration plays in governance.
The executive branch in Puerto Rico should entail an

innovative dimension that introduces a new political and

administrative discourse in which the Public Administration
is viewed as a collaborative partner in the process of

governance.

Here

I

follow the normative emphasis of the

legitimacy perspective, which recognizes the Public

Administration as an institution of government rather than
an instrument of the Chief Executive.
To introduce a new discourse that will enhance the role
of public administration in governance will start the

tendency to legitimate the administrative state in Puerto
Rico.

The first step is to produce a shift in the prevalent

discourse in order to emphasize the function of

administrative agencies as government institutions rather
than to put exclusive attention on their organization.

This

will produce a change in the character of public

administration in Puerto Rico.
When

I

say to legitimize the administrative state,

I

do

not mean to abandon the traditional emphasis on

gubernatorial leadership in administration.

What

I

mean by

legitimating the administrative state is to recognize, on
constitutional grounds, the role of public administration in
governance.

This is to acknowledge the distinctive nature
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of public administration.

As Warr.sley et al

state,

"The

distinctive nature of the Public -Administration lies in
the
fact that it is part of the governance process,

that it is

in a political context and competence directed toward
the

public interest"

39).

(p.

This acknowledgement implies a

re-conceptualization of government agencies as instruments
of action in

pursuit of the public interest.

This emphasis on legitimacy does not attempt to change
the subordinate status of the Public Administration.

Rohr (1985) asserts,

As

"The Public Administration neither

constitutes nor heads any branch of government, but is

subordinate to all three of them"

(p.182)

.

"In dealing with

its constitutionally derived ambiguity and discretion"

Wamsley et al

.

,

,

says

"the Public Administration must always act

within the constraints imposed by its origin in covenant,
covenant manifested in the Constitution..."

a

(p.45).

A second step is to recognize the importance of the
formal virtue of public administrators as actors in the

process of governance.

administrators have

a

This virtue presupposes that public
right to choose among constitutional

superiors when disagreements in policy arise.

This means

that they may have to be responsive to the Governor at one
point,

to the Legislature at another,

other times.

or to the courts at

The central point is that public

administrators "should certainly use their discretion to
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.

favor those policies that they think are likely to promote
the public interest"

(Rohr,

expressed by the Governor.

p.

183),

and not only those

This will enable them to view

the authority of their own institutions as legitimate.

importantly,

More

it is to recognize that in the virtue of pubic

officials resides an opportunity to shape events, so that
government becomes more responsive to the people's will

embedded in the constitution rather than to immediate

pressures
A third step to form the new discourse is to adopt the

concept of public interest as the appropriate normative

basis for public administrators.

Pendleton Herring defines

this concept as "the standard that guides the administrator
in executing the law"

(quoted in Goodsell,

1993).

In

executing the laws, public administrators should use their

discretion to discover the public interest in the midst of
conflicting demands and clashing interests.

Wamsley et al

.

state,

This is,

as

"to play the long-term public interest

rather than the most immediate and powerful pressures"
(p.48).

In essence,

legitimating the administrative state

is vesting in it the ultimate responsibility to be

responsive to the constitutional order and the democratic

governance process
The analysis of the Founders',

the managerial,

and

legitimacy perspectives helps us understand the practice of
120

reorganization planning in Puerto Rico and its contributions
in creating a strong executive.

indicates that,

But this analysis also

in order to address the issue of

illegitimacy of the administrative state, we have to turn to
the emphasis of the legitimacy perspective.

This promises a

new discourse that will accord the public administration in
Puerto Rico not only a distinctive character but also its

place in the democratic governance process.
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